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INTRODUCTION
A picturesque, seaside pavilion in Ocean Grove, New Jersey,
owned and controlled by United Methodists since its creation in 1870,
is described in its charter as a “portion of land skirting the sea,
2
consecrated to sacred uses and with a single eye to the Divine Glory.”
Almost 150 years later, this one-time site of religious revival meetings
has become one of the many flashpoints nationwide between religious
groups supporting the traditional definition of marriage and same-sex
marriage proponents seeking to enforce antidiscrimination laws.
Despite the Methodist group’s desire that no one use its pavilion for
activities directly contrary to its religious identity, New Jersey’s
Division on Civil Rights held in January 2009 that the Methodists must
allow a lesbian couple to use the pavilion for their same-sex civil union
3
ceremony. This finding is the subject of ongoing litigation in federal
4
court. Using the Ocean Grove case as a prototypical harbinger of
2

Leo H. Carney, Ocean Grove Tries to Keep Its Old Charm in New Times, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 1986, at NJ1 (quoting the charter of the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting
Association).
3
Op. N.J. Att’y Gen., Div. on Civil Rights, No. PN34XB-03008 (Dec. 29, 2008),
available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-v-06CMA
.pdf; see also Associated Press, Lesbian Pair Wins Ruling over Refusal of Ceremony, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008, at A22 (reporting on the New Jersey ruling that Ocean Grove’s
refusal to host a lesbian wedding ceremony was a violation of anti-discrimination laws).
4
After this ruling, Ocean Grove filed suit in federal district court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that the state acceptance and investigation
of antidiscrimination suits violated Ocean Grove’s First Amendment rights. Ocean
Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n of the United Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, No. 073802, 2007 WL 3349787, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2007). The district court dismissed the
case based on abstention principles. Id. at *6. On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the case to the federal district court to decide
Ocean Grove’s request for declaratory relief clarifying its rights as to the use of the rest
of its property. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church v.
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future conflicts, this Comment explains why same-sex marriage
antidiscrimination laws pose a genuine and sincere theological
problem for many religious institutions and explores some of the
possible First Amendment defenses with which religious institutions
might respond to such laws.
For religious groups of all stripes, a case like the pavilion
controversy in Ocean Grove is anything but an isolated anomaly; it is
instead a signal of an increasingly frequent wave of conflicts between
same-sex marriage proponents and traditional religious organizations.
The same-sex marriage movement has rapidly gained steam through
landmark state supreme court rulings establishing a constitutional
right to same-sex marriage or civil union despite the movement’s
limited success in legislative spheres and, indeed, against legislative
5
attempts to limit its spread.
To be sure, the same-sex marriage movement has been a study in
fits and starts. The movement’s first wave began in 1993, when state
6
7
8
courts in Hawaii, Alaska, and Vermont recognized a constitutional
right to same-sex marriage or civil unions. Answering this judicial
activity, voters in Hawaii and Alaska passed state constitutional
amendments overturning the decisions. Continuing the movement
yet again a decade later—and with seemingly even greater momentum

Vespa-Papaleo, Nos. 07-4253, 07-4543, 2009 WL 2048914, at *1-2 (3d Cir. July 15,
2009).
5
See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining
marriage as “a legal union between one man and one woman”); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(2006) (providing that states need not give effect to laws in other states providing for
same-sex marriage). For information on state DOMAs, see infra note 85.
6
See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the state’s
definition of marriage requiring that couples be of the opposite sex implicated the
state’s Equal Protection Clause), reh’g granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993),
remanded sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *18 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
1996) (striking down the state’s opposite-sex definition of marriage on Equal
Protection grounds and finding neither a compelling state interest nor narrow
tailoring), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1998).
7
See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at
*4-5 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (applying strict scrutiny standard to opposite-sex
marriage laws and finding “the decision to choose one’s life partner [is] a fundamental
right”), superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (amended
1999).
8
See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the State was
“constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and
protections” of marriage but allowing the legislature to determine the name and form
of the protection).
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and success since 2006—Massachusetts, New Jersey, California, and
12
Connecticut followed suit in recognizing same-sex marriage. In
13
14
15
2009, Iowa, the District of Columbia, and Vermont became the
most recent additions to the same-sex marriage column, the latter two
by legislative rather than judicial action.
Some states, however, have successfully fought back against some
of the judicially created same-sex marriages. Between 2004 and 2006,
in the wake of the Massachusetts decision, eighteen states passed state
constitutional amendments limiting marriage to heterosexual
16
couples. More recently, in November 2008, voters approved state
referenda banning same-sex marriage in California, Arizona, and
17
The Arizona amendment prevailed after having been
Florida.
9

See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (“The
marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the
community for no rational reason.”).
10
See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220-21, 224 (N.J. 2006) (holding that state
opposite-sex marriage laws violate New Jersey equal protection rights and providing a
180-day deadline for establishing same-sex marriage or its equivalent). The New Jersey
legislature complied and established civil unions without denominating them
marriages. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31 (West 2007). Although concluding at the time
that the court would “not presume that a difference in name alone is of constitutional
magnitude,” one might expect future litigation to require calling these civil unions
“marriages,” as the plaintiff argued in Lewis. 908 A.2d at 221-22.
11
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 435 (Cal. 2008) (holding that California
equal protection law requires that same-sex couples have a right to “marriage” and not
merely civil unions).
12
See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 418 (Conn. 2008)
(holding under intermediate scrutiny that despite civil union laws same-sex couples
have an equal protection right to civil marriage).
13
See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (holding unanimously
that the state equal protection clause requires recognition of same-sex marriage).
14
Gary Emerling, D.C. to Recognize State Gay Marriages, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009,
at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 6631146.
15
David Abel, Vermont Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage: 11th Hour Change of Heart Ends
Veto, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 6539576.
16
See Daniel Burke et al., Scorecard: Who Won, Who Lost on Election Day, CHRISTIAN
CENTURY, Nov. 28, 2006, at 13 (describing the 2006 voter-approved amendments
banning gay marriage in Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Wisconsin); Thomas Roberts & Sean Gibbons, Same-Sex Marriage Bans
Winning on State Ballots: 11 States Approve Constitutional Amendments to Outlaw Gay
Nuptials, CNN.COM, Nov. 3, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/02/
ballot.samesex.marriage/index.html (reporting the 2004 voter-approved amendments
banning gay marriage in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah).
17
See Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, Proposition 102 Unofficial Results for the 2008
General Election (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.azsos.gov/results/2008/general/
BM102.htm (citing that 56% of voters approved a constitutional amendment to limit
marriage to opposite-sex couples); Cal. Sec’y of State’s Office, Proposition 8 Election
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defeated in 2006—the first time an amendment to ban same-sex
18
marriage had been defeated. In California, the state supreme court
upheld Proposition 8 as a valid state constitutional amendment in May
2009, but Ted Olson and David Boies have initiated a federal suit
19
challenging the ban on federal equal protection grounds. Evident in
this conflicting and messy recent history is every indication that, at
least for the foreseeable future, same-sex marriage will be a reality
alongside which religious institutions will have to operate.
While same-sex marriage has made similar inroads in other
20
countries around the world, the particular challenge facing same-sex
marriage in the United States is its reception into such an historically
and enduringly religious context—in particular, a context where
21
homosexuality has traditionally been opposed on religious grounds.
Night Results (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/
maps/returns/props/prop-8.htm (citing 52% approval for a constitutional ban on
same-sex marriage); Fla. Dep’t of State, Div. of Elections, Proposition 2 Official Results
(Nov. 4, 2008), http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?
ElectionDate=11/4/2008 (citing 62% approval for a constitutional amendment to
limit marriage to opposite-sex couples).
18
See Burke, supra note 16.
19
See Bob Egelko, Judge Sets January Trial for Prop. 8 Lawsuit, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 20,
2009, at D3.
20
The Netherlands (2000), Belgium (2003), Spain (2005), Canada (2005), South
Africa (2006), Norway (2008), and Sweden (2009) all permit same-sex marriage. See
THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, GAY MARRIAGE AROUND THE WORLD
(2009), http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=423; see also Kees Waaldijk, Others May
Follow: The Introduction of Marriage, Quasi-Marriage, and Semi-Marriage for Same-Sex
Couples in European Countries, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 569, 585-89 (2004) (discussing steps
taken by European countries to recognize same-sex relationships).
21
See, e.g., Adelle M. Banks, Think You Know What Americans Believe About Religion?
You Might Want to Think Again, RELIGION NEWS SERVICE, June 23, 2008,
http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID=15907 (finding that 57% of
Americans who attend religious services weekly believe that “homosexuality should be
discouraged by society”); News Release, The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life &
The Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Religious Beliefs Underpin
Opposition to Homosexuality (Nov. 18, 2003), available at http://pewforum.org/docs/
index.php?DocID=37 (finding that “those with a high level of religious commitment
now oppose gay marriage by more than six-to-one”); cf. Pew Research Ctr. for the
People & the Press & Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Most Still Oppose Gay
Marriage, but Support for Civil Unions Continues to Rise (Oct. 9, 2009),
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1375/gay-marriage-civil-unions-opinion
[hereinafter
Pew Research Ctr., Most Still Oppose Gay Marriage] (“More than three-quarters of
white evangelical Protestants (77%) and two-thirds of black Protestants (66%) oppose
same-sex marriage, as do half of white mainline Protestants (50%). Catholics are
evenly divided on the issue, with 45% favoring same-sex marriage and 43% opposing it.
Most of those unaffiliated with any particular religion support same-sex marriage
(60%).”). It is clear that among religiously identified respondents—those who attend
services more frequently and are presumably more devout—the alignment is starker.
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Unlike in other industrialized nations—consider the almost
completely secularized countries of Western Europe—Americans
continue to exhibit high rates of religious belief, practice, worship
22
attendance, and service. In addition to the history and continuing
private practices of citizens, freedom of religion has been legally
23
enshrined in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; it is even
popularly known to some as America’s “first freedom,” because it is
24
the first protection enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Despite the
claim of some that religion, even in America, is undergoing an
25
inevitable decline, plenty of evidence suggests otherwise.
See id. (“Overall, a strong majority of those who attend services at least weekly oppose
same-sex marriage (71%), while about half of those who seldom or never attend
religious services favor it (54%). . . . Most regularly attending white Catholics in the
survey oppose same-sex marriage, while most white Catholics who attend Mass less
often favor it. Among white evangelicals, 85% of those who attend services at least
weekly oppose same-sex marriage, 21 percentage points higher than among lessobservant white evangelicals.”).
22
See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO
AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 82 (2005) (arguing that popular uproar over Michael
Newdow’s lawsuit challenging the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance
indicates “the extent to which Americans are one of the most religious people in the
world, particularly compared to the peoples of other highly industrialized
democracies”). Huntington also cites statistics that support the common view of
America’s religiosity: 92% of Americans believe in God, 85% believe that the Bible is
in some way the word of God, and 63 to 66% of Americans claim membership in a
church or synagogue. Id. at 86-87; see also Carolyn A. Deverich, Comment, Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence and the Free Exercise Dilemma: A Structural Unitary-Accommodationist
Argument for the Constitutionality of God in the Public Square, 2006 BYU L. REV. 211, 212
(citing similar statistics indicating that Americans are relatively religious compared to
citizens of other industrialized countries).
23
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24
See Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2000) (discussing why the First Congress made religious
freedom the subject of the First Amendment); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 563 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (viewing the Free Exercise Clause’s
substantive guarantee of liberty as “no less important” than the Free Speech or Takings
Clauses); PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 17 (1964), quoted in City
of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 563 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur whole constitutional
history . . . supports the conclusion that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that
its recognition may either require or permit preferential treatment on religious
grounds in some instances . . . .”). Despite the brevity and deceptive simplicity of the
First Amendment’s text, the Religion Clauses are some of the most hotly contested
words in the Constitution, and there is no shortage of secularists who decline to accord
the Clauses much importance. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion
Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473, 477 (1996) (calling the Free Exercise Clause
“a limited aberration in a secular state”).
25
See Michael Novak, The First Institution of Democracy. Tocqueville on Religion: What
Faith Adds to Reason, 6 EUR. VIEW 87, 92 (2007) (arguing with survey data that
“empirical evidence does not show that religion has lost public salience in recent
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In addition to the nation’s pervasive religious character,
Americans have historically conceived of marriage in both law and
society as a sacred, religious, and pre-political institution that is the
foundation of society. In his influential Commentaries on American Law,
Chancellor James Kent observes that “[t]he primary and most
important of the domestic relations is that of husband and wife. It has
its foundation in nature, and is the only lawful relation by which
26
Providence has permitted the continuance of the human race.” The
belief in the power of traditional marriage originated in the United
States not only through the mostly homogenous Christian beliefs
about marriage in the late eighteenth century but also because the
American founders understood “the symbiotic connection between
family virtues and civic virtues” and believed that traditional marriage
was a way to sustain the virtue necessary for the smooth running of the
27
Republic.
Amidst an enduringly religious population and against such a
deeply rooted institution as traditional marriage, common sense
suggests that the introduction of same-sex marriage into American law
would represent anything but a seamless transition. Contrary to that
supposition, same-sex marriage proponents—even some of the state
courts responsible for constitutionalizing same-sex marriage—are
optimistic about the ease of transition. In its majority opinion in In re
Marriage Cases, the California Supreme Court predicted that
“affording same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain the designation
of marriage will not impinge upon the religious freedom of any
religious organization, official, or any other person; no religion will be
required to change its religious policies or practices with regard to
28
same-sex couples.” Similarly optimistic, the 2004 Goodridge Court in
Massachusetts declared, “Our decision in no way limits the rights of
individuals to refuse to marry persons of the same sex for religious or

times”); Peter Baker, Bush Tells Group He Sees a “Third Awakening,” WASH. POST, Sept.
13, 2006, at A6 (noting that some “scholars and writers have debated for years whether
a Third Awakening has been taking place”).
26
2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 74 (3d ed., New York, E.B.
Clayton & James van Norden 1836).
27
David F. Forte, The Framers’ Idea of Marriage and Family, in THE MEANING OF
MARRIAGE: FAMILY, STATE, MARKET, & MORALS 103 (Robert P. George & Jean Bethke
Elshtain eds., 2006); see also id. at 106 (noting that the Founders’ synthesizing of
marriage as a political institution and an entity governed by Christian norms “gave the
institution of marriage and the family more power, authority, and inner strength than
at any time in [the] history of the West”).
28
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451-52 (Cal. 2008).
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any other reasons. It in no way limits the personal freedom to
disapprove of, or to encourage others to disapprove of, same-sex
29
marriage.”
Yet the notion that expanding the definition of marriage to
include same-sex couples will “not impinge upon” religious freedoms
30
is difficult to square with reality on the ground. In a world where
same-sex marriage did not impinge upon religious freedoms, the
United Methodists who own the pavilion in Ocean Grove would not be
forced to rent their facility for a same-sex civil commitment ceremony.
The foundation of this Comment is the belief that the legalization
and spread of same-sex marriage will indeed have far-reaching and
profound effects on religious liberty, particularly on the rights of
many religious institutions that oppose same-sex marriage and wish to
avoid appearing to endorse such marriage through compelled
compliance with prospective same-sex antidiscrimination laws. There
are a host of areas in which conflict seems likely: violations of
antidiscrimination laws in public accommodations, employment,
31
housing, education, or charitable services; loss of tax-exempt status
32
33
for violating “public policy”; and violation of hate-crime laws, just to
name a few. Absent explicit statutory exemptions for religious
34
institutions, the possibility for serious conflict exists.

29

Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 n.29 (Mass. 2003).
Indeed, conflicts in this area abound. In 2006, Massachusetts prevented
adoption agencies from declining to place children with same-sex couples, and the
decision forced the state’s largest such agency, Catholic Charities, to exit the adoption
business altogether. See Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston, THE WEEKLY STANDARD,
May 15, 2006, at 17. Litigation is currently pending in a case regarding a New Mexico
wedding photographer who faces $6,600 in attorneys’ fees for declining to take
pictures of a lesbian civil commitment ceremony and in the case of a Christian
counselor in Georgia who declined to advise a woman in a lesbian relationship and
referred her to another therapist. Jacqueline L. Salmon, Faith Groups Increasingly Lose
Gay Rights Fights, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2009, at A4.
31
Roger Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty,
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 939, 957-58, 964 (2007) (arguing that antidiscrimination
laws in these areas pose potential threats to religious liberty).
32
See infra text accompanying notes 88-91.
33
See infra note 81 (describing the pervasiveness of hate-crime laws referencing
sexual orientation).
34
See David Blankenhorn & Jonathan Rauch, A Reconciliation on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at WK11 (proposing that Congress grant federal civil union status
to state same-sex marriages and grant exemptions for religious institutions in states
with religious-conscience exceptions).
30
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Rather than catalog the countless foreseeable legal conflicts
35
between same-sex marriage and religion, as others have done, this
Comment seeks to explore in greater depth the seriousness of the
challenge to religious activity and to assess some potential First
Amendment defenses with which a confronted religious actor or
institution could respond, paying particular attention to the likeliest
successful argument: the right to expressive association.
Part I discusses why marriage is a fundamentally religious—not
just social or political—issue on which religious institutions have a
particularly justifiable desire to advance and protect their theological
viewpoint. Part II emphasizes the breadth of religious activity in the
United States as a prelude to revealing the particular ways in which
same-sex antidiscrimination laws pose serious challenges to dissenting
religious institutions; contrary to the position of the state supreme
courts of California and Massachusetts, the challenge is real and
pervasive. Part III briefly examines the Free Exercise Clause from one
conceptual perspective and concludes in light of recent
jurisprudence—quite ironically to anyone unfamiliar with Free
Exercise case law—that a stronger defense for dissenting religious
institutions likely resides elsewhere. Finally, Part IV articulates the
expressive association doctrine of the First Amendment and, through
application to the pending Ocean Grove case, argues that this doctrine
provides a more robust defense for religious institutions seeking to
avoid endorsing same-sex marriage despite the presence of same-sex
antidiscrimination laws.
I. THE RELIGIOUS NATURE OF MARRIAGE
Religious institutions express substantial concern about marriage
because of their belief that marriage carries deep theological meaning
and significance. Many view marriage not only as a social institution
in which religious actors play a role but also as an intrinsically
religious concept in itself. This theological understanding does not,
of course, negate the reality that marriage is also a social institution
regulated by secular authorities. However, the longstanding and
widely shared theological view of marriage serves as a necessary
foundation justifying many religious institutions’ belief that
35

Especially helpful as a catalog of potential areas for legal skirmishes between
religious actors who oppose same-sex marriage and same-sex marriage proponents is
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello,
Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008).
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promoting their understanding of marriage constitutes a core tenet of
36
their religious mission.
Appreciating the specifically religious
character of marriage is important because presumably, under either
the Free Exercise Clause or the expressive association doctrine,
religious institutions should have a greater expectation of protection
for clearly religious—rather than secular or political—beliefs and
actions. The dominant religious traditions in the United States today
all endow marriage with a complex, specifically religious
conceptualization separate from and in addition to secularly based
37
social understandings of marriage. The discussion below details this
religious conceptualization from the Christian perspective, the
38
dominant strand of religion in the United States.
In the Roman Catholic Church, the largest single religious
39
denomination in the United States, marriage is understood not just
as a religious concept but also as a sacrament. Marriage is one of only
40
seven sacraments recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. Thus,
to mark marriage as a sacrament is to place it within a collection of

36

The same-sex marriage controversy does not mark the first time Christians have
attempted to enforce their own views of marriage against a competing secular
definition. Ancient Roman law forbade slaves from marrying unless their unions were
characterized as concubinage; because the early Church would not tolerate the denial
of “proper married status” to any Christian, bishops gave slaves special permission to
marry and kept it secret from the Roman authorities. See ROSEMARY HAUGHTON, NO.
23: THE THEOLOGY OF MARRIAGE 41 (Edward Yarnold ed., Fides Publishers Inc. 1971).
37
As Pope Leo XIII declared in his encyclical Arcanum Divinae Sapientiae,
Let no one, then, be deceived by the distinction which some civil jurists have
so strongly insisted upon—the distinction, namely, by virtue of which they
sever the matrimonial contract from the sacrament . . . . [I]n Christian
marriage the contract is inseparable from the sacrament . . . for this reason,
the contract cannot be true and legitimate without being a sacrament as well.
Pope Leo XII, Encyclical Letter Arcanum Divinae Sapientiae ¶ 23 (Feb. 10, 1880),
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_10
021880_arcanum_en.html.
38
For the sake of simplicity and brevity, this Part includes a number of
generalizations that will pertain to some—I would argue many—but not all Christian
institutions in the United States. The nature of this discussion should not obscure the
variety of views on marriage held by American religious institutions. See generally Mark
Strasser, Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions:
On Meaning, Free Exercise, and
Constitutional Guarantees, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 597, 604-10 (2002) (discussing the
multiplicity of religious views regarding the permissibility of same-sex marriage).
39
See, e.g., Richard John Neuhaus, Columnists Say It . . ., FIRST THINGS, Nov. 2,
2005, http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2005/11/rjn-11205-columnists-say-it
(noting that, with 66 million members in the United States, Catholicism is the largest
Christian denomination in the country).
40
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1210 (2d ed. 1997).
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the most sacred religious practices of the Church. The Catechism of
the Catholic Church describes the sacraments as
efficacious signs of grace, instituted by Christ and entrusted to the
Church, by which divine life is dispensed to us. The visible rites by which
the sacraments are celebrated signify and make present the graces
proper to each sacrament. They bear fruit in those who receive them
41
with the required dispositions.

Thus, according to the Catholic Church, sacraments are divine in
origin and are the primary means by which believers receive spiritual
nourishment from God through the Church.
The six other
sacraments are Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance and
42
Reconciliation, the Anointing of the Sick, and Holy Orders.
Considering this list, which includes the beginning, end, and weekly
rituals of a Christian’s life, marriage is included among the most
important religious marks of Christian life. It is also noteworthy that
this list contains purely religious concepts, not moral, social, or
political concepts derived from religion.
For Protestants, although marriage is not deemed a sacrament, it
is nonetheless proclaimed as an important and distinctly religious
43
concept, frequently described as a covenant. Mainly for historical
reasons stemming from perceived Roman Catholic abuses that
precipitated the Protestant Reformation, Protestants retain a belief in
the religious significance of marriage as an important part of religious
44
life without identifying it as a sacrament as Roman Catholics do.
Nonetheless, Protestants have esteemed marriage as equally important
in content and imbued with distinct religious significance. Many
Protestant churches describe marriage as a covenant—a deeply
religious term permeated with biblical significance—that churches
45
believe is “a God-willed, holy, and sanctifying vocation.”

41

Id. § 1131.
Id. § 1210.
43
See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. BROUWER, BEYOND “I DO”: WHAT CHRISTIANS BELIEVE
ABOUT MARRIAGE 21-23 (2001) (describing a covenant as an unbreakable, enduring
bond possessing religious significance).
44
Appealing to scriptural authority rather than tradition or Catholic Church
authority, Protestants limited the sacraments they recognized to two: baptism and
communion. In doing so, they did not necessarily demean the religious significance of
concepts not designated as sacraments. Two of the hallmarks of Protestantism are
preaching and Bible study, yet neither is a sacrament.
45
Michael G. Lawler, Marriage, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO CHRISTIAN
THOUGHT 410 (Adrian Hastings et al. eds., 2000).
42
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Although they have different labels for it, almost all Christian
churches share a similar theological view of the religious significance
and particular importance of marriage. Contrary to some popular
perceptions, the Christian theological interpretation of marriage is
richer and more sophisticated than merely supporting a particular
46
Rather, as the
view on sexual ethics or a beneficial way of life.
Catechism of the Catholic Church explains, “The marriage covenant,
by which a man and a woman form with each other an intimate
communion of life and love, has been founded and endowed with its
47
own special laws by the Creator.”
Christian theology views the institution of marriage as a divinely
granted order that has existed since the very creation of humanity
itself. The account of creation in the Book of Genesis indicates that
God intended marriage as a necessary and proper relationship
48
between men and women. Because this recognition of marriage is
tied textually to Christian beliefs about the origins of humanity, the
institution of marriage also signifies broader theological views about
49
humanity itself. This includes, for example, belief in the intrinsic
equality between men and women: humanity as the image of God is
not complete until the expression of male and female unity is
50
achieved.
Marriage also holds significance for Christians as a symbol of
God’s redemption of and continued unity with humanity. The
Hebrew prophetic literature conceives of marriage as a symbol of the

46

One commentator describes the mischaracterization as follows:

There is a not uncommon assumption to the effect that Christian marriage is
essentially ethical marriage, that is, that a couple have a Christian marriage if
they live together with at least a minimum level of respect, love, and
decency. . . . But if Christianity is no more than that, there is no such thing as
the Christian religion.
HENRY A. BOWMAN, A CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF MARRIAGE 19 (1959).
47
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 40, § 1660.
48
See Genesis 2:18 (quoting God as saying, “It is not good that the man should be
alone; I will make him a helper as his partner”); Id. 2:24 (“Therefore a man leaves his
father and his mother and clings to his wife, and they become one flesh.”).
49
See JOHN L. THOMAS, THE CATHOLIC VIEWPOINT ON MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY
56 (John J. Delaney ed., rev. ed., Image Books 1965) (1958) (“Catholic teaching on
marriage and the family must be viewed within this wider context, embodying a
concept of the Church’s mission, the nature of man, and the nature of grace.”).
50
See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, A THEOLOGY OF MARRIAGE 14-15 (1967) (“Man,
complete and whole, is not created until male and female come together in a union of
one flesh which makes them a whole being. . . . [A person] makes himself fully human
by finding in his spouse the remedy for his own inadequacies as a male or female.”).
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unbreakable covenant between God and God’s people, Israel.
Bolstered by a similar understanding based on New Testament
scripture, “Christian matrimony [signifies] a great supernatural reality
52
(union of Christ and the Church).” To religious institutions, these
theological bonds between Christ and the Church and between God
and Israel are theological expressions of the permanent, covenantal
unity between God and God’s people as well as an expression of love.
As a result, many view marriage analogously as a relationship
connected to God that is covenantal, permanent, and an ultimate
53
expression of love. Pope John Paul II even describes marriage as “a
54
real symbol of the event of salvation.”
Finally, the theological view regarding the purposes of marriage
provides another important indication of marriage’s specifically
51

See Lawler, supra note 45, at 410 (“The root of Christian ideas about the
sacramentality of marriage goes back to the prophet Hosea’s enthronement of
marriage as a prophetic symbol of the covenant between God and Israel.”).
52
OUR SUNDAY VISITOR’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CATHOLIC DOCTRINE 414 (Russell
Shaw ed., 1997).
53
Lawler supports the idea that marriage is analogous to and revelatory of
God’s love:
The conscious presence of Christ, that is, of grace in its most ancient Christian
meaning, is not something extrinsic to Christian marriage. It is something
essential to it, something without which it would not be Christian at all.
Christian marriage reveals the love of the spouses for one another; but, in the
image of their love, it also reveals the love of God and of God’s Christ for
them. It is in this sense also that, in the Catholic tradition, it is said to be a
sacrament of the presence of Christ and of the God he reveals.
Lawler, supra note 45, at 410. Other commentators describe an even deeper
connection between God and marriage:
Christian marriage . . . has a real, essential, and intrinsic reference to the
mystery of Christ’s union with His Church. It is rooted in this mystery and is
organically connected with it, and so partakes of its nature and mysterious
character. Christian marriage is not simply a symbol of this mystery or a type
that lies outside it, but an image of it growing out of the union of Christ with
the Church, an image based upon this union and pervaded by it. For it not
only symbolizes the mystery but really represents it. It represents the mystery
because the mystery proves active and operative in it.
MATTHIAS J. SCHEEBEN, MYSTERIES OF CHRISTIANITY 601-02 (1946). The symbol of the
universal Church and Christ united as a bride and groom is a central analogy in
Christian theology and pervades the New Testament. See, e.g., John 3:28-29; Matthew
9:14-15; Ephesians 5:31-33; Revelation 19:6-9.
54
Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation Familiaris Consortio § 13 (Nov. 22,
1981), http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/docume
nts/hf_jp-ii_exh_19811122_familiaris-consortio_en.html (describing marriage as “a
typically Christian communion of two persons because it represents the mystery of
Christ’s incarnation and the mystery of His covenant”).
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religious character. In addition to being a state intrinsically “ordered
55
toward the good of the spouses,” Christian theology has traditionally
affirmed the purposes of marriage as directed towards procreation
and education. First, according to Christian theology, marriage is the
ideal context in which human reproduction occurs, a process in which
husband and wife affirm their place as a reflection of the image of
God by undertaking a traditionally exclusive action of divinity:
56
creation. Second, marriage and the development of families are the
central bases outside the Church itself for teaching the Christian
57
faith.
This discussion of the specifically religious character of marriage
is important because it illustrates the extent to which religious
institutions hold a particularly religious belief in marriage that—at
least theoretically—should receive more constitutional protection
than a nonreligious belief. Imagine a spectrum of subjects on which a
religious institution could hold a belief, with purely religious concepts
at one end and purely secular concepts at the other end. Marriage, as
the above discussion shows, falls much closer to the religious end than
to the secular. A religious institution might also hold a belief or
preference regarding a purely secular issue—for example, whether
trigger locks should be required for gun owners. But while a religious
group may hold this secular policy position as a result of religious
principles, the position is attenuated from the institution’s central
55

CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 40, § 1601. Bolstering the
link between theological arguments and real-world impact, empirical research suggests
a link between greater religious commitment and stronger marriages. See, e.g., Kieran
T. Sullivan, Understanding the Relationship Between Religiosity and Marriage:
An
Investigation of the Immediate and Longitudinal Effects of Religiosity on Newlywed Couples, J.
FAM. PSYCHOL. 610, 617 (2001) (finding that more religious husbands and wives
exhibited stronger feelings of aversion to divorce and a greater willingness to seek help
to preserve the marriage).
56
See BOWMAN, supra note 46, at 22 (“The couple’s bodies will permit them to
establish a sexual, a procreative relationship. Their God-centered orientation will
permit them to establish a spiritual, a creative relationship.”); cf. Pope Pius XI,
Encyclical Letter Casti Connubii (Dec. 31, 1930) ¶ 80, http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/index.htm (describing marriage as “the means of
transmitting life, thus making the parents the ministers, as it were, of the Divine
Omnipotence”).
57
See SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, GRAVISSIMUM EDUCATIONIS
[DECLARATION ON CHRISTIAN EDUCATION] art. 3 (1965), http://www.vatican.va
/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/index.htm (noting that it is “particularly in
the Christian family, enriched by the grace and the office of the sacrament of
matrimony, that children should be taught from their early years to have a knowledge
of God according to the faith received in Baptism, to worship Him, and to love their
neighbor”).
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expertise in and concern for religious matters. It is also less likely that
the group’s religious identity would turn on the viewpoint it offered
on such a purely secular question. Marriage, however, is different—at
least for many religious institutions—precisely because it is an
independent, even central, religious concept that can connect directly
to the institution’s religious identity. Religious institutions should be
able to expect, at least presumptively, that the government may not
constitutionally bar them from expressing their religious beliefs or
identity.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
TO LEGITIMATE RELIGIOUS DISSENT
Despite reassuring words by recent state supreme court decisions
addressing same-sex marriage and dismissing the potential danger,
the growing movement for same-sex marriage poses a legitimate and
serious threat to the conscientious beliefs of many religious
institutions. Were religion purely a private and individual matter, as
some commentators and courts have presumed, perhaps the conflict
58
would be less ominous than it is. But while it would be convenient to
cabin religious activity to a narrow and identifiable realm to minimize
the conflict between religion and an increasingly large and invasive
bureaucratic state, this categorization belies the theological beliefs
and practices of many religious institutions.
As religious actors attempt to operate consistently with their
religious principles, both in public and in private, they will confront
some state or federal laws that will seek to enforce competing but, in
the government’s eyes, equally legitimate goals. The sweeping
changes to the definition of marriage wrought by recent and
increasingly frequent state supreme court decisions like Goodridge, In
58

Justice Scalia has put the problem this way:

Church and state would not be such a difficult subject if religion were, as the
Court apparently thinks it to be, some purely personal avocation that can be
indulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in the privacy of one’s room.
For most believers it is not that, and has never been. Religious men and
women of almost all denominations have felt it necessary to acknowledge and
beseech the blessing of God as a people, and not just as individuals . . . .
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Mary Ann
Glendon, Individualism and Communitarianism in Contemporary Legal Systems: Tensions
and Accommodations, 1993 BYU L. REV. 385, 408 (noting that the Supreme Court has
“repeatedly characterized [religion] . . . as a purely private individual experience” and
that the Court has “ignored the fact that for many individuals religious freedom has
important associational and institutional aspects”).
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59

re Marriage Cases, and Conaway v. Deane, have given same-sex marriage
supporters well-justified hope that the likely irreversible train of samesex marriage has already left—or will soon leave—the station.
Because marriage serves as a foundational part of the United States’
social structure, changes to marriage law will necessarily implicate
actors and institutions in a wide variety of contexts throughout society.
Given how “deeply intertwined” religious institutions are with the
celebration of and belief in marriage, religious institutions will face a
disproportionately large burden when marriage laws are
60
fundamentally altered.
A. The Multifaceted Nature of Religious Activity
How broadly one defines the scope of religious activity and
identity will shape, in part, the extent of the threat posed by same-sex
marriage. How, then, should one understand the nature and extent
of religious activity? At one time this question may have been less
important because sectarian religious activity was not always as suspect
as it has become today. While Christianity remains overwhelmingly
the single largest religious influence, it (and to some extent religion
in general) may be fading in the United States in favor of
61
privatization, pluralism, and secularism. As such, society as a whole
may be less familiar than earlier eras with what, broadly speaking,
orthodox Christianity teaches about the scope of religious activity.
Because Christianity is the majority American religion, this Section
will focus on what Christian theology teaches about the nature of
religious exercise. Despite the multiplicity of denominations in the
62
United States, it is possible to make some generalizations regarding
what Christian theology teaches about religious activity.

59

932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007).
See Severino, supra note 31, at 943 (“The specific consequences that will likely
flow from legalizing same-sex marriage include both government compulsion of
religious institutions to provide financial or other support for same-sex married
couples and government withdrawal of public benefits from those institutions that
oppose same-sex marriage.”).
61
See generally STEVE BRUCE, GOD IS DEAD: SECULARIZATION IN THE WEST 20
(2002) (arguing that “the privatization of religion removes much of the social support
that is vital to reinforcing beliefs . . . and encourages a de facto relativism that is fatal to
shared beliefs”).
62
See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174-75 (1965) (noting the great variety
of belief within religious groups, evidenced by the multiplicity of denominations within
those groups).
60
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First, despite the American preoccupation with individualism and
autonomy, Christian theology teaches that religion is a corporate
endeavor. While it is true that religion is also an association with God
at the individual level—questions regarding one’s soul are
63
The
ubiquitous—Christianity is viewed as a corporate religion.
Catechism of the Catholic Church goes so far as to assert, “No one can
64
believe alone, just as no one can live alone.”
Second, while worship and corporate gatherings are central to
Christianity, those specific events do not exhaust the definition of
religious exercise, despite some claims to the contrary. Some argue
that one can express the essence, and perhaps the very metes and
bounds of religious exercise, via a short list of activities connected to
65
religious ceremony, ritual, and proselytizing. For those desiring to
limit the scope of authentic religious expression and exercise, this
definition is advantageous because it largely confines religious activity
to the sanctuary. However, as Harold J. Berman, renowned Harvard
Law professor and expert on the relationship of Christianity and the
rise of Western law, has explained, religion “is not only a set of
doctrines and exercises; it is people manifesting a collective concern
for the ultimate meaning and purpose of life—it is a shared intuition
66
of and commitment to transcendent values.” Thus, while it is easy to
admit that worship and sacraments are central components of
religious exercise, one understands the complete picture only by
considering the ends of worship and the sacraments.
Christian worship in its different forms has slightly different
emphases. Broadly speaking, Catholic and Episcopal traditions focus
more on the liturgical and sacramental acts of worship, while for many
in Protestant traditions the sermon or interpretation and teaching of
Scripture receives the greater emphasis. Each, however, imparts great
significance not only to the worship acts of adoration, prayer, and

63

Describing the vocation of humanity, the Catechism states, “This vocation takes
a personal form since each of us is called to enter into the divine beatitude; it also
concerns the human community as a whole.” CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH,
supra note 40, § 1877; see also JOHN H. LEITH, BASIC CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 234 (1993)
(“To be a Christian and to be the church are one and the same existence.”).
64
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 40, § 166.
65
See, e.g., Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d
253, 273 (3d Cir. 2007) (listing potentially covered acts as “assembling with others for a
worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing,
[and] abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation” (quoting
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990))).
66
HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 24 (1974).
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bearing witness to the mysteries of faith through Word and sacrament,
but to how the act of worship empowers and teaches the individual to
be fit to serve God and neighbor in the world. The Roman Catholic
Catechism explains that the purpose of worship is “so that the faithful
67
may live from it and bear witness to it in the world.” Indeed, the
68
“sacred liturgy does not exhaust the entire activity of the Church.”
For Protestants, the statement of the Great Ends of the Church by the
Presbyterian Church (USA) provides a pertinent summary of the
nature and ends of religious exercise, and only two of the six items
69
mentioned directly involve worship.
The Presbyterian Church’s statement of the overarching ends of
the Church include, in addition to worship, fellowship, the
preservation of truth, the promotion of social righteousness, and the
70
exhibition of the Kingdom of Heaven to the world. Two important
points emerge from this exposition. First, religious activity is
necessarily concerned with service and advocacy that attempt to shape
the social order of the world. Second, the Church’s mission includes
a solemn commitment to maintain, develop, and defend certain ideas
and arguments—the preservation of truth—both inside and outside
the Church. Religion is, then, much more than ceremony and is
necessarily both a private and a public undertaking. Religious activity
deals intimately not just with private belief and actions, but also with
actions that are often public and representative of corporate beliefs.
The Presbyterian Church (USA) affirms that one of the key tenets of
the Reformed Protestant tradition is to “work for the transformation
71
of society.” This is necessarily public work, and its truth did not
escape famed nineteenth-century French visitor to the United States
Alexis de Tocqueville, who observed for this reason that religion is
72
America’s “first political institution.”

67

CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 40, § 1068.
Id. § 1072 (quoting SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, SACROSANCTUM
CONCILIUM [CONSTITUTION ON THE SACRED LITURGY] art. 9 (1963),
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/index.htm).
69
The “proclamation of the gospel for the salvation of humankind” and “the
maintenance of divine worship” are the two ends that directly involve worship. THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.) PART II: BOOK OF ORDER,
2009–2011 § G-1.0200 (2009).
70
Id.
71
Id. § G-2.0500.
72
See Novak, supra note 25, at 92 (explaining the visible and often highly political
nature of religion in early America).
68
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Even if religious activity is broad, it is not all-encompassing.
Christianity, like most religions, necessarily pertains to ultimate
concerns about how adherents should live.
With such allencompassing categories as these, it is possible to conceive of a
limitless concept of religious activity. Towards this end, for example,
theologian Martin Luther challenged the Roman Catholic notion of
religious vocations by arguing that a Christian had a religious vocation
in whatever profession he or she engaged—even if it were sweeping
floors—because of the Christian’s identity as a Christian rather than
73
any one particular career choice. That said, traditional Christian
theology recognizes that secular authorities exist in the world and,
derivatively, that some activities fall outside the scope of what could be
74
defined as religious activity.
To help determine what exactly counts as religious activity,
75
consider again the spectrum discussed above.
When a religious
institution’s belief or activity pertains specifically to a theological
matter or religious practice, the religious institution may more easily
argue that its activity is religious. For purely secular matters that
contain no direct religious component, the religious institution will be
less able to argue that its belief or activity is religious. If, as argued in
Part I, marriage is a religious concern, then a religious institution’s
beliefs and actions with respect to marriage should presumably be
considered “religious activity.”
B. Challenges to Religious Institutions Opposed to Same-Sex Marriage
Religious institutions that support traditional marriage will likely
face serious legal challenges and catch-22 situations should they
choose to support traditional marriage in opposition to constitutional
or statutory rights for same-sex marriage. Nonetheless, in its 2008
decision constitutionalizing same-sex marriage, the California Supreme
Court argued, “[A]ffording same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain
the designation of marriage will not impinge upon the religious
freedom of any religious organization, official, or any other person; no
73

MARTIN MARTY, MARTIN LUTHER: A LIFE 104 (2008) (“Luther . . . made a
distinction between the honored way that one lives out a calling in the professions,
jobs, tasks, and roles here below on earth and the also honored way that the same
person receives a calling from God through the grace which relates to life above in
heaven.”).
74
See Matthew 22:21 (“Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and
to God the things that are God’s.”).
75
See supra Part I.
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religion will be required to change its religious policies or practices with
76
regard to same-sex couples . . . .” Against the easy dismissals of the
California and Massachusetts Supreme Courts, Roger Severino of the
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty (an interfaith public interest law
firm that promotes religious expression) notes four reasons why the
conflict between same-sex marriage and religious liberty is inevitable.
First, marriage, as a uniform concept, pervades the law; second,
religious institutions are regulated, both directly and indirectly, by
laws that turn on the definition of marriage; third, religion has an
historically public relationship with marriage that resists radical
change as a deep matter of conscience; and fourth, same-sex marriage
proponents are similarly resistant to compromise since many believe,
in line with the Goodridge concurrence, that “[s]imple principles of
decency dictate that we extend to [same-sex couples], and to their
77
new status, full acceptance, tolerance, and respect.”
The particular concern of this Comment is whether religious
institutions may successfully oppose same-sex marriage and avoid the
appearance of endorsement that compelled compliance with
prospective antidiscrimination laws would bring. If state or federal
governments fail to provide any religious exemptions for same-sex
antidiscrimination laws, religious institutions that wish to avoid
liability under those laws will require a constitutional defense.
Concretely, one recent source of danger to the religious activity of
traditional marriage proponents is the increasingly expansive
conception given to public accommodation law as a vehicle for
reaching private actors like religious institutions. As they stand today,
the public accommodation provisions of federal law contain no
78
specific religious exemptions.
The particular law at issue in the
Ocean Grove case provides an excellent example of the type of statute

76

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451-52 (Cal. 2008).
Severino, supra note 31, at 942 (alteration in original) (quoting Goodridge v.
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 973 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., concurring)); cf.
Brietta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty and the Liberty of
Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital Conflict, 82 OR. L. REV. 625, 629 (2003)
(“Conflicts due to laws burdening religious conduct present the most controversial and
difficult free exercise questions since there are many laws designed to regulate the
health, safety, and welfare of society that unintentionally burden religiously motivated
conduct.”).
78
Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 1 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell
Wilson eds., 2008) (discussing the coverage of the public accommodations provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
77
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The New Jersey law states in

[a]ll persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to
obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of
any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination because
of . . . marital status, [or] affectional or sexual orientation . . . subject
only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. This
79
opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.

Additional troubling areas for religious institutions could include
violations of antidiscrimination laws in employment, housing,
education, or charitable services simply for following their conscience
80
or theology with respect to same-sex marriage. There is even the
prospect of “hate speech” laws that could prevent or at least chill an
organization from expressing even rationally grounded natural law
arguments or widely shared theological arguments against same-sex
81
It is true that the prospect of clergy being compelled
marriage.
personally to perform same-sex marriage ceremonies is not now a
cognizable threat. Nonetheless, religious actors and institutions do
face both potential lawsuits and the prospect of losing tax-exempt
status or other government privileges as a result of their advocacy
against same-sex marriage or their desire to avoid the appearance of
its endorsement by forced association with the practice (such as

79

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -5 (West 2002). The New Jersey Supreme Court’s
interpretation of New Jersey’s public accommodation law provides more substantial
coverage than similar laws in other states. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
663 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80
See Severino, supra note 31, at 957-58 (“[A]ntidiscrimination regulations that
would attend the widespread recognition of same-sex marriage threaten to erode the
traditional deference to religious sensibilities, thus creating traction for . . . lawsuits.”).
81
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty observed, in a 2007 amicus brief, that
“[g]eneral hate-crime statutes exist in at least 45 states. Of those, currently 32
states . . . have hate-crime laws referencing sexual orientation. . . . Some states have
already taken the next step and banned sexual-orientation related hate speech directly,
as in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.” Brief [of] Amicus Curiae the Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty in Support of Defendant at 8-9, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862
(Iowa 2009) (No. 5965). Specifically, in 2004, Christians who were peaceably
protesting were arrested on public property at a Philadelphia gay pride event for
“ethnic intimidation” under hate crimes laws. See Startzell v. City of Phila., No. 0505287, 2007 WL 172400, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2007). Also consider the church that
offered a series of discussions regarding the theological case against homosexuality
after it discovered that its youth minister had participated in a civil commitment
ceremony with her lesbian partner; the youth minister sued the church for its religious
speech. See Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 651-53 (10th Cir. 2002)
(affirming the dismissal of the youth minister’s case).
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through the forced renting of a church banquet hall for a same-sex
wedding reception).
At the constitutional level, the fact that each of the landmark state
supreme court decisions has so far been confined to the respective
state’s boundaries should provide little comfort to religious
institutions supporting traditional marriage. Same-sex marriage
82
proponents envision a day when the Full Faith and Credit Clause will
be used to recognize, in a state prohibiting same-sex marriage, a same83
sex marriage validly entered into in a state allowing such marriage.
This possibility remains real despite the federal Defense of Marriage
84
Act (DOMA) and the fact that thirty-nine states have passed state
85
versions of DOMA or its equivalent. Although some scholars have
86
argued persuasively against it, there is reason to suspect that, after
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas struck
down Texas’s anti-sodomy law, DOMA faces a serious threat of being
87
ruled unconstitutional.

82

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”).
83
See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the
Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 35-36 (2005) (arguing that the Full Faith
and Credit clause should be interpreted to require interstate recognition of valid
Massachusetts same-sex marriages).
84
DOMA is comprised of two important provisions. First, with respect to federal
laws and regulations, “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). Second, the law
provides that “[n]o State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.” 28 U.S.C. §
1738C (2006).
85
See Alliance Defense Fund, DOMA Watch Home Page, http://www.doma
watch.org/index.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2009) (“37 states have their own Defense of
Marriage Acts (DOMAs), while 2 more states have strong language that defines
marriage as one man and one woman.”).
86
See, e.g., Randy Beck, The City of God and the Cities of Men: A Response to Jason
Carter, 41 GA. L. REV. 113, 150 (2006) (concluding that Lawrence v. Texas does not
imply a “constitutional right to same-sex marriage”).
87
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s
opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction
to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal
recognition in marriage is concerned.”); see also Severino, supra note 31, at 957
(“Anyone seeking to strike down DOMA and establish same-sex marriage nationwide
will find plenty of ammunition in Lawrence.”).

BOLD REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2009]

Vows to Collide

12/8/2009 12:25 PM

201

The Bob Jones decision should also give religious institutions pause
in the event that public opinion polls slide decisively toward
permitting same-sex marriage. In Bob Jones University v. United States,
the United States Supreme Court held that a private, Christian
fundamentalist university must lose its tax-exempt status or forfeit its
religiously based policy of denying admission to applicants engaged in
an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or
88
dating. The Court based its decision in part on IRS Revenue Ruling
89
71-447, which embraces the common law definition of “charity.”
Under § 170 and § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, tax
exempt organizations must not engage in activity contrary to settled
90
“public policy.” Given Bob Jones, if same-sex marriage becomes even
more widespread and accepted throughout society, dissenting
religious organizations could lose their tax-exempt status for adhering
91
to their religious beliefs about marriage. Regardless of one’s beliefs
about the substantive merits of any particular public policy-based
restriction via Bob Jones, religious institutions should be wary of
effectively losing their advocacy rights through this back door.
While recent polling data continues to suggest that a majority of
Americans disapprove of same-sex marriage, the margin has
92
diminished. Furthermore, support for acceptance of homosexuality
generally, and thus for allowing civil unions or other benefits short of
93
The demographic most
marriage to same-sex couples, has risen.
94
likely to support gay rights is the young.
If this fact foretells a
generational change of attitude towards homosexuality, instead of
merely a belief that most young people outgrow over time, religious
88

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
90
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585, 591-92.
91
Conceivably, courts could also simply rule that infringement of an
antidiscrimination statute violates “public policy” by definition.
92
Charles Franklin, Gay Marriage Support and Opposition, POLLSTER.COM, May 21,
2008, http://www.pollster.com/blogs/gay_marriage_support_and_oppos.php (“The
net effect of some 16 years of public debate was a 10 point decline in opposition and a
12 point rise in support.”).
93
Id. (“When the ‘civil unions’ option is added, opposition to gay rights drops
significantly from about 55% to 40%. Likewise, support for gay marriage drops from
40% to 29%.”); see also Pew Research Ctr., Most Still Oppose Gay Marriage, supra note
21 (“Over the past year, support for civil unions has grown significantly among those
who oppose same-sex marriage (from 24% in August 2008 to 30% in 2009) while
remaining stable among those who favor same-sex marriage.”).
94
See Leslie Fulbright, Voters Still Split on Same-Sex Marriage, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 10,
2009, at B1 (“Voters aged 18 to 39 favor gay marriage by 55 percent while those 65 or
older are 58 percent opposed, according to the poll.”).
89

BOLD REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

202

12/8/2009 12:25 PM

[Vol. 158: 179

institutions have even more cause for concern. None of this is to say
that religious actors and institutions have a right to have others agree
with them or that public mores and policies cannot change. Yet all of
these data are relevant because judicial history in dealing with
similarly divisive social issues has demonstrated the reliance of courts
95
on public opinion polls. Even if a significant minority of religious
actors maintains traditional beliefs on same-sex marriage, as those
beliefs become more unpopular, religious institutions’ ability to
exercise those beliefs publicly will become much more difficult, even
if theoretically they should be protected under the First
96
Amendment.
For religious institutions with limited budgets that may be averse
to litigation risk, the advocacy of traditional marriage could be chilled,
potentially increasing even further the popular support for same-sex
marriage as fewer organizations make public arguments to oppose it.
Harmful in a different way, if religious institutions’ silence is
interpreted as tacit support for, or indifference to, same-sex marriage,
religious institutions could send an unintended message. If the public
sees religious institutions such as the Methodist pavilion owners
allowing same-sex civil commitment ceremonies on their premises,
casual observers may erroneously think the Methodist church has
changed its historic stance against same-sex marriage. Likewise, if a
church is reluctant to publicly make the case against same-sex
marriage out of fear of facing an expensive and distracting lawsuit or
fear of losing tax-exempt status, it may decide simply to avoid the issue
instead. Given the general dearth of reasoned arguments against
same-sex marriage in academia, the media, and the entertainment
industry, should religious actors and institutions be misperceived or
unfairly quieted, the public would lose one of the most important
95

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (noting as part of the argument
for overturning Bowers “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex”(emphasis added)); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 699 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“Over the years, however, interaction with real people, rather than
mere adherence to traditional ways of thinking about members of unfamiliar classes,
have modified those opinions [regarding homosexuality].”); see also Robert A. Dahl,
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-maker, 6 J. PUB. L.
279, 291-93 (1957) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court rarely “plant[s] itself
firmly against a lawmaking majority” by holding federal legislation unconstitutional).
96
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-05 (1983) (revoking the
tax-exempt status of a religious university that banned interracial dating and marriage
as part of its admissions policy, even though the policy stemmed directly from sincerely
held religious beliefs).
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sources of debate and discussion on this social controversy. With
religious actors thus diminished in their power to make public
arguments or statements, one should not be surprised that public
opinion on same-sex marriage would become more permissive.
Similarly, Harvard Law professor and former United States
ambassador to the Holy See, Mary Ann Glendon, has argued that
same-sex marriage is dangerous for religious institutions supporting
traditional marriage because, once legal, opponents of same-sex
marriage will be treated as pariahs, and a form of reverse
discrimination will occur. Glendon writes,
As much as one may wish to live and let live, the experience in other
countries reveals that once these arrangements become law, there will be
no live-and-let-live policy for those who differ. Gay-marriage proponents
use the language of openness, tolerance and diversity, yet one
foreseeable effect of their success will be to usher in an era of
intolerance and discrimination the likes of which we have rarely seen
before. Every person and every religion that disagrees will be labeled as
bigoted and openly discriminated against. The ax will fall most heavily on
religious persons and groups that don’t go along. Religious institutions
97
will be hit with lawsuits if they refuse to compromise their principles.

Regarding scenarios exactly like this, the late Father John Neuhaus,
one of Time’s 100 most influential public intellectuals, often quipped
(but only half in jest) that where orthodoxy becomes optional,
98
orthodoxy will sooner or later be proscribed.
III. THE FREE EXERCISE DEFENSE
The purview of this Comment is not to provide an exhaustive
analysis of the Free Exercise Clause. Given the varied interpretations
the Clause has received in the past, however, it is worth investigating
97

Mary Ann Glendon, For Better or for Worse?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2004, at A14; see
also Mark Galli, Is the Gay Marriage Debate Over? What the Battle for Traditional Marriage
Means for Americans—and Evangelicals, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, July 2009, at 31 (“A recent
poll of Massachusetts residents revealed that 36 percent of voters who oppose gay
marriage agreed with the statement, ‘If you speak out against gay marriage in
Massachusetts you really have to watch your back because some people may try to
hurt you.’”).
98
Victor Morton & Julia Duin, Faith Community Mourns ‘Inspirational’ Neuhaus:
Catholic Leader, 72, Dies from Cancer, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at A1, available at 2009
WLNR 465436; see also Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr. (Jan. 24,
1774) (describing the “diabolical, hell-conceived principle” that allowed “five or six
well-meaning men [being imprisoned] in close jail for publishing their religious
sentiments, which in the main are very orthodox”), in 1 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON,
1769–1783, at 18, 21 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900).
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whether the Clause could assist religious institutions as a defense
against same-sex antidiscrimination laws. First, does the text and
intent of the Free Exercise Clause provide support for a defense of
religious institutions promoting traditional marriage? Second, how
does the Supreme Court’s contemporary free exercise jurisprudence
treat these types of cases? Despite a compelling argument that the
text and intent of the Free Exercise Clause could be understood to
provide a defense for religious institutions on an issue like marriage,
the Court’s new line of jurisprudence, begun in Employment Division v.
99
Smith, regarding neutral, generally applicable laws, casts doubt upon
the success of such an argument without a marked change in the
Court’s analysis.
A. One View of the Text and Intent of the Free Exercise Clause
Although competing theories exist, it is at least plausible that the
text and intent of the Free Exercise Clause should provide religious
institutions meaningful protection for their beliefs and actions with
respect to marriage. While it is the text of the amendment—not the
history or the intentions of the drafters—that is constitutional law, in
order to respect the reality that the government is guided by a written
constitution, it is both necessary and instructive to consider seriously
the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause as it was understood
100
As the Court has observed, “No provision of the
when ratified.
Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating
101
Finally,
history than the religious clause of the First Amendment.”
at the outset, it is worth noting the obvious: the Free Exercise Clause
is an explicit constitutional provision in which the framers chose to
protect “religion” rather than similar or similarly important
102
This point may be relevant for same-sex marriage
categories.
antidiscrimination statutes in as-applied challenges by religious
institutions; the United States Supreme Court has long held that more

99

494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not
exempt religious actors from duties imposed by neutral and generally applicable laws).
100
See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 11-15 (1986)
(arguing that it is appropriate to use history in interpreting the Free Exercise Clause).
101
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
102
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1034 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[I]t is crucial to
realize that the free exercise clause does not protect all deeply held beliefs, however
‘ultimate’ their ends or all-consuming their means.”).
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stringent scrutiny applies to statutes that fall under specific textual
103
prohibitions of the Bill of Rights.
The Religion Clauses read, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
104
exercise thereof.”
Distinct from other constitutional amendments,
the First Amendment is a negative right, today preventing both the
federal and state governments from enacting certain types of laws,
105
The
rather than a positive “right, privilege, or immunity.”
Department of Justice has expressed the view that, as a negative right,
the text may suggest that the framers viewed the free exercise of
religion as the type of right that is inalienable rather than as one of
106
the “mere civil privileges conferred by a benevolent sovereign.”
“Free exercise,” however, is not a crystalline term; the scope of its
coverage is open to interpretation. Thus, crucial to understanding
free exercise is familiarity with the debate about which categories of
107
religious activities it protects.
The classic and perhaps most
important debate has centered on whether the Free Exercise Clause
protects both beliefs and actions or only the former. The proposition
that the Clause protects the belief and the profession of religious
doctrine against unfavorable government compulsion, punishment,
108
disabilities, or favoritism is widely accepted today.
However, the history of the extent to which action was thought to
be protected is complicated and has vacillated over time. In his
famous “wall of separation” letter to the Danbury Baptist Association,
Thomas Jefferson wrote, “the legislative powers of government reach
actions only, and not opinions . . . . [M]an . . . has no natural right in
103

See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 n.27 (2008)
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
[i.e., narrower than that provided by rational-basis review] when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten amendments . . . .” (italics omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))).
104
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
105
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 100, at 15. On the incorporation of the
Free Exercise Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
106
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 100, at 16.
107
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1463 (2d ed. 2005) (“The
Free Exercise Clause . . . obviously does not provide absolute protection for religiously
motivated conduct.”).
108
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (indicating a number
of different prohibitions on government conduct as it relates to religious belief,
including government’s inability to compel belief affirmation or to punish the
expression of beliefs it deems false).
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109

opposition to his social duties.” This opinion of Jefferson’s was the
basis for the Court’s early ruling that free-exercise exemptions to
110
generally applicable laws may apply to opinions but not to actions.
However, both before and after Jefferson, commentators and courts
took a less restrictive view. William Penn in 1670 understood freedom
of conscience to include “the exercise of ourselves in a visible way of
111
worship,” and well-known Virginia judge and professor St. George
Tucker, a religious moderate, included in an 1803 definition of
112
freedom of conscience both religious opinions “and duties.”
Consideration of the historic context of religion in the Founding
period adds further perspective for interpreting the Religion Clauses.
It is well known that some of the founders, including Thomas
Jefferson, favored the period’s more philosophical approach to
religion, deism, but Michael McConnell argues that to place the focus
113
there is a mistake. Rather, McConnell contends, the existence of a
widespread and powerful evangelical religious revival provides the
114
In an irony often
more determinative historical focal point.
underappreciated in history lessons, religious rationalists, to whom
many attribute the very same deist tendencies suspected by some to
buttress the Religion Clauses, were the ones that were “far more likely
115
than the enthusiastic believers to side with the established church.”

109

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Comm. of the Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1,
1820), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 281, 281-82 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1904).
110
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“Laws . . . cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, [but] they may with practices.”).
111
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1451-52 (1990) (quoting WILLIAM PENN,
The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience Debated, in 1 A COLLECTION OF THE WORKS OF
WILLIAM PENN 447 (1726)).
112
ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 96, 97 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); see
also JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 45
(2005) (“For most eighteenth-century writers, religious belief and religious action went
hand in hand, and each deserved legal protection.”).
113
McConnell, supra note 112, at 1437 (“It is a mistake to read the religion clauses
under the now prevalent assumption that ‘the governing intellectual climate of the late
eighteenth century was that of deism (or natural law).’” (quoting William P. Marshall,
The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 357, 377 (1989))).
114
Id. (citing a historian who believed that “the Enlightenment world view
‘excludes many, probably most, people who lived in America in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries’”).
115
Id. at 1440.
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On the one hand, representatives of non-established religions—
such as Baptists—took free exercise and disestablishment principles
116
very seriously to demand a separation of church and state, while it
was republicans who regarded religion no less seriously but saw it
more instrumentally as an important guarantor of civic virtue,
meaning it should be in some way affiliated with, and supported by,
the state. McConnell observes,
The paradox of the religious freedom debates of the late eighteenth
century is that one side employed essentially secular arguments based on
the needs of civil society for the support of religion, while the other side
employed essentially religious arguments based on the primacy of duties
to God over duties to the state in support of disestablishment and free
117
exercise.

The upshot of this analysis is that it avoids perceiving the
church/state problem at the Founding as understood predominantly
in either Lockean terms (preventing religious discord through
tolerance and making religion irrelevant to political affairs) or in
republican terms (viewing religion as an instrument that serves the
state’s interest). Rather, from the dominant perspective of the
religious enthusiasts whose political efforts, McConnell claims, most
helped bring about the First Amendment, the crux of the problem
was too much state power and interference directed against religious
freedom. As such, the proper meaning and scope of protected free
exercise may very well be determined not by the matters the public or
state is concerned about but “by [the] matters God is concerned
118
about, according to the conscientious belief of the individual.”
116

The Supreme Court has also noted the historical link between calls for strict
disestablishment and free exercise. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947)
(“[I]ndividual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was
stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to
interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.”).
117
McConnell, supra note 111, at 1442.
118
Id. at 1446; see also WITTE, supra note 112, at 97 (“To read the [F]ree [E]xercise
[C]lause too minimally is hard to square with the widespread solicitude for rights of
conscience and free exercise reflected in the First Congress’s debates.”); James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (“Before any man can
be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the
Governor of the Universe.”), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1783–1787, at 185
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). Despite Madison’s absolutist disestablishment view of
church and state presented by Justice Rutledge’s famous dissent in Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. at 28-63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting), in which Rutledge identifies
Madison as the premier authority on the meaning of the Religion Clauses, Madisonian
thinking on free exercise was similarly starkly drawn in favor of broad religious
exercise. As the discussion herein observes, this seeming inconsistency between strict
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Given this history, Professor John Witte’s formulation of free exercise
is apt: “[T]he right to act publicly on the choices of conscience once
made—up to the limits of encroaching on the rights of others or the
119
Contrast this view with the
general peace of the community.”
perspective of modern liberalism, which “tends to protect religious
freedom only when it does not matter—when it is private and
120
At least one important reading of the Free
inconsequential.”
Exercise Clause suggests that this latter view is incompatible with the
121
intent behind the Religion Clauses.
B. Supreme Court Free Exercise Jurisprudence
Despite good arguments for a robust interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause based on text, history, and public policy, the Clause in
practice has not provided as much protection as some religious
122
adherents might desire. The text of the Free Exercise Clause is brief

disestablishment and robust free exercise is friendly, rather than unfriendly, to
religion, and is indeed no contradiction at all. But see Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The
Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1085 (2008) (arguing that the drafters’ notes on the Free
Exercise Clause shed “almost no light” on its original meaning but that the Clause
likely did not support conscientious exemptions because when Congress considered
what would become the Second Amendment, the First Congress “directly considered
and rejected a constitutional right to religious-based exemption from militia service”).
This debate played itself out in the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997). Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and Souter generally agreed with McConnell’s
interpretation of the history discussed herein, id. at 548-65 (O’Connor, J., dissenting),
and Justices Scalia and Stevens rejected the same history as inconclusive. Id. at 537-44
(Scalia, J., concurring).
119
WITTE, supra note 112, at 45.
120
McConnell, supra note 24, at 1265.
121
There is also a competing body of academic literature against favoring
widespread exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause. See generally MARCI A.
HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005); MICHAEL J.
MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1978); Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren
Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991); Philip A. Hamburger, A
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 915 (1992); Philip A. Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835 (2004); Philip B.
Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and
the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3 (1979); Marshall, supra note 113; Mark Tushnet,
The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1988);
Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591 (1990); Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in
Early America: The Case of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 367
(1993–94).
122
Scholars note two broad understandings of the Free Exercise Clause:
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and open to multiple interpretations, and the history regarding its
intent and purpose is widely debated; consequently, this area of
123
constitutional law is one that is driven by common law. This Section
examines the Court’s position, not on every potential free exercise
issue, but on a sample of the likely critical issues for religious
institutions facing same-sex antidiscrimination statutes: namely, the
extent to which the Clause covers actions as well as beliefs and how
the Clause is interpreted as a defense against neutral, generally
applicable laws.
Separating religious free exercise into its two components—belief
and action—the Free Exercise Clause has successfully protected
religious belief absolutely but provides only qualified protection for
124
religiously motivated conduct.
The Supreme Court first had occasion for significant treatment of
the Free Exercise Clause’s protection of beliefs versus actions in

First, one could conceive of the Free Exercise Clause as primarily promoting
religious autonomy-—facilitating the ability of religious adherents to practice
their faiths, even when such practice entails violating generally applicable laws
enacted without religiously discriminatory intent. The alternative approach
would conceptualize the Clause in terms of enhancing relative equality among
and between religious sects.
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the
(Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2008). The latter
reading, of course, provides less support to religious institutions. One scholar has
noted the lack of doctrinal development in free exercise and suspects that courts may
be uncomfortable with combining necessary judicial compromise and eternal truths.
See Alan E. Brownstein, Justifying Free Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 504, 506
(2003) (“Comparing religion clause doctrine to free speech or equal protection
doctrine today is like comparing a Dick and Jane reading primer to The Brothers
Karamazov.”).
123
STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE, at iii (2d ed. 2006) (“Because the
Court has gone beyond the First Amendment’s text to define the proper limits of the
relationship between church and state, interpretive issues have always been at the
forefront of Religion Clause litigation.”).
124
The Supreme Court discussed the distinction between regulating belief and
action in the first Smith case:
The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any
governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such . . . . On the other hand,
the Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to
governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or
principles, for “even when the action is in accord with one’s religious
convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions.”
Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 n.13 (1988) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963)).
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125

Reynolds v. United States, where the Court held that beliefs are
126
protected, but actions are not.
The case before the Court
concerned a Mormon’s argument that the Free Exercise Clause
entitled him to an exemption from a law criminalizing polygamy. The
Court cited Thomas Jefferson’s view of the Religion Clauses as the
127
nearly authoritative word on the Clauses’ interpretation. The effect
of Jefferson’s and the Court’s reading is that the Free Exercise Clause
protects an individual’s religious beliefs but fails to protect the
128
At one level, this
religious actions that flow from those beliefs.
distinction is necessary for government to function. As the Court in
Reynolds worried, there would be a point at which—free to act
according to one’s own religious beliefs regardless of the state’s law—
129
a person could become “a law unto himself.”
Evolving over time from its initial position in Reynolds, the Court
subsequently upheld the right of religious groups to solicit funds
130
under the Free Exercise Clause. Without going so far as to protect
all religious conduct, the Court stated, “In every case the power to
regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end,
131
The Court further
unduly to infringe the protected freedom.”
extended the protection of the Free Exercise Clause in Sherbert v.
132
Verner, a case involving a claim for unemployment benefits by a
woman whose religion prevented her from working on Saturdays.
The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefits and
argued that “to condition the availability of benefits upon this
appellant’s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious
faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional

125

98 U.S. 145 (1878).
Id. at 145 (“A party’s religious beliefs cannot be accepted as a justification for
his committing an overt act, made criminal by the law of the land.”).
127
Id. at 164 (concluding that Jefferson’s view “may be accepted almost as an
authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured”).
128
Id. (“Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order.”).
129
Id. at 167. Even the Catholic Church recognizes this principle. CATECHISM OF
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 40, § 2109 (“The right to religious liberty can of
itself be neither unlimited nor limited only by a ‘public order’ conceived in a positivist
or naturalist manner.”).
130
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 107, at 1472 (tracing the development of the Court’s
free exercise jurisprudence).
131
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
132
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
126
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133

liberties.” For a law that infringes upon religious free exercise, strict
134
scrutiny was the appropriate test.
Then, in 1990, in Employment Division, Department of Human
135
Resources v. Smith, the Court significantly modified its free exercise
doctrine and addressed both the issue of belief versus action and how
the Free Exercise Clause applies against neutral, generally applicable
laws. Additionally, the Court articulated what remains the current test
for Free Exercise Clause violations. Smith involved a challenge to
Oregon’s criminalization of the drug peyote. After being denied
unemployment benefits because they were fired for violating Oregon’s
controlled substance law, two Native American Church members
unsuccessfully sought protection under the Free Exercise Clause,
arguing that they had only used peyote as a ceremonial sacrament.
The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit
Oregon’s application of its drug laws to the ceremonial ingestion of
peyote and that the state could, therefore, deny the men
unemployment benefits. The Court, with Justice Scalia writing for the
majority, held that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
136
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”
Even under the narrow province given to Free Exercise by the
Court in Smith, contra Jefferson, the Court believed that some room
137
exists for protecting religious action.
Four Justices on the Smith
Court, however, supported the argument Justice O’Connor made for
an even more permissive protection for religious conduct, a view that
may comport more faithfully with the First Amendment’s original
138
139
purposes and context. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence rested on
133

Id. at 406.
Id. at 403.
135
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
136
Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
137
Id. at 877 (“[T]he ‘exercise of religion’ often involves not only belief and
profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with
others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine,
proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation.”). The
drawback of the Court’s definition is that it only protects actions that are prohibited
because they were engaged in for religious reasons or for the religious belief they
exhibit. Id.
138
Because the makeup of the Court has changed since the 5-4 Smith decision, it is
possible that the Court going forward may fall in line behind Justice O’Connor’s view.
From the Smith Court, only Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Kennedy remain today (all in
the Smith majority).
134
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a more robust understanding of “exercise,” noting that it includes,
among other things, permission to engage in “religious observances
such as acts of public and private worship, preaching, and
140
Observing the absence of any distinction between
prophesying.”
belief and conduct in the Free Exercise Clause, Justice O’Connor
concluded that “conduct motivated by sincere religious belief . . . must
141
be at least presumptively protected.”
This concurrence also resisted the Smith majority’s absolute
142
deference to neutral laws of general applicability.
Instead, the
O’Connor bloc emphasized that the logical and straightforward
consequence of a neutral law of general applicability could easily
accomplish the very end prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause:
143
The
barring the free exercise of religiously motivated conduct.
result of this restriction, Justice O’Connor argued, is to place would-be
religious adherents between the Scylla of obeying civil law at the
expense of divine law and the Charybdis of obeying divine law at the
expense of civil law. Striking at the core of what free exercise means,
Justice O’Connor concluded that
the essence of a free exercise claim is relief from a burden imposed by
government on religious practices or beliefs, whether the burden is
imposed directly through laws that prohibit or compel specific religious
practices, or indirectly through laws that, in effect, make abandonment
of one’s own religion or conformity to the religious beliefs of others the
144
price of an equal place in the civil community.

Justice O’Connor believed it crucial to recognize that in placing
“substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
145
violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.”

139

Justice O’Connor concurred with the majority in judgment, although the
opinion she wrote and the more permissive view of free exercise she advocated make it
difficult to explain her vote with the majority.
140
Smith, 494 U.S. at 893 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
141
Id.
142
Id. at 901 (“There is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general
applicability . . . for [such laws] can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience
or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion.”).
143
Id. at 893 (“[A] law that prohibits certain conduct--conduct that happens to be
an act of worship for someone--manifestly does prohibit that person’s free exercise of
his religion.”).
144
Id. at 897.
145
Id. (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
717-18 (1981)).
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What has the Court’s stance been after Smith? Church of the Lukumi
146
Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, a case involving ritual animal
sacrifice, is the only Supreme Court decision so far to interpret and
147
apply Smith. In this case, a church of the Santeria religion brought
an action challenging city ordinances prohibiting the sacramental
slaughter of animals. The Court held that the city ordinances were
neither neutral nor generally applicable and that the governmental
interest allegedly advanced by the ordinances did not justify targeting
148
religious activity. Thus, the Court affirmed that a free exercise claim
could survive after Smith for statutes that were not actually neutral and
generally applicable, but the Lukumi decision did nothing to ease the
nearly impregnable barrier between a free exercise claim and a statute
that is neutral and generally applicable.
C. Problematic Application to the Ocean Grove Case
In sum, due to the high barrier erected by the Smith Court against
free exercise claims challenging neutral, generally applicable laws,
religious institutions will likely need more than the Free Exercise
Clause to successfully mount a constitutional defense to same-sex
antidiscrimination laws. Most likely, courts would consider the type of
statute anticipated by this Comment to be neutral and generally
applicable. Under the Smith doctrine, therefore, religious institutions
would not be able to use the Free Exercise Clause as a source of
constitutional protection for violating, in support of traditional
marriage, same-sex antidiscrimination laws.
However, even if it were true that Smith made it significantly more
difficult to challenge a neutral, generally applicable law on free
exercise grounds, possible alternatives may exist. First, religious
institutions in certain states could potentially avail themselves of the
compelling interest test via state Religious Freedom Restoration Act
statutes in making a free exercise defense based on state
149
constitutional grounds.
Likewise, the federal Religious Freedom
146

508 U.S. 520 (1993).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 107, at 1478.
148
For commentary on both Smith and Lukumi, see Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise
Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 (2001).
149
See Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State
Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235, 253-62 (1998) (providing several examples of
strong state protection of free exercise rights); Robert M. O’Neil, Religious Freedom and
Nondiscrimination: State RFRA Laws Versus Civil Rights, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 785, 792-93
147
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Restoration Act remains a valid route for satisfying the compelling
interest test should a federal same-sex marriage antidiscrimination
150
statute arise.
Second, the majority opinion in Smith left open the possibility of a
successful Free Exercise Clause defense when a neutral, generally
applicable law was challenged on free exercise grounds and an
151
additional constitutional ground.
Whereas the employment
compensation statute in Smith only implicated free exercise concerns,
a court could hold a statute unconstitutional in other “hybrid
152
In
situation[s]” that implicate more than one constitutional right.
discussing the fact that free speech cases often contain an additional
dose of freedom of religion, the Court commented specifically that “it
is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of
association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise
153
Clause concerns.” As argued in Part IV of this Comment, there is a
strong expressive association defense in the Ocean Grove case. Thus,
even after Smith it is possible that a court could combine a free
exercise and expressive association claim and receive compelling
interest review even regarding a neutral, generally applicable
antidiscrimination law. Some scholars are optimistic that this “hybrid
rights” theory could be successful for Free Exercise claims even after
154
Smith; however, other scholars have offered strong objections to the

(1999) (surveying the issues a state faces if it wishes to pass RFRA laws that provide
stronger free exercise protection).
150
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down RFRA on
federalism grounds only with respect to a state law).
151
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (“The only decisions in
which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law . . . have involved . . . the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional provisions . . . .”).
152
Id. at 882 (“The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a
free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right.”).
153
Id. Even if it is easy to envision, courts have had difficulty understanding and
interpreting the hybrid rights doctrine. See Timothy J. Santoli, Note, A Decade After
Employment Division v. Smith: Examining How Courts Are Still Grappling with the HybridRights Exception to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
649, 665-67 (2001) (identifying three separate approaches to interpreting Smith’s
hybrid-rights exception among the circuit courts).
154
One author agues, for example, that as same-sex marriage gathers increasing
support from religious groups it may be possible to bring a free exercise claim
challenging same-sex marriage bans under a hybrid rights theory. See Ariel Y. Graff,
Free Exercise and Hybrid Rights: An Alternative Perspective on the Constitutionality of Same-Sex
Marriage Bans, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 23, 25 (2006) (arguing that “religious exemptions
from same-sex marriage bans are required under a hybrid rights analysis”).
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exception, leaving the doctrine’s utility in question.
At minimum,
the hybrid-rights theory could enable a sympathetic lower court to
evade the Smith doctrine and find a free exercise claim colorable
156
enough to warrant heightened scrutiny. Because the viability of this
strategy would turn on the success of an expressive association claim,
157
it is to an analysis of that defense that we now turn.
IV. THE EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION DEFENSE
A. Doctrinal Overview
Ironically, despite the explicit textual protection of the free
exercise of religion in the First Amendment, religious institutions in
practice often receive greater protection under First Amendment
158
doctrines other than the Religion Clauses. Another important locus
159
of rights for religious entities is the right to freedom of association.
While the First Amendment text does not explicitly mention this
right, the Supreme Court has upheld the “freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas [as] an
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech”
160
The Court’s justification for this protection is
and assembly.
consonant with concerns religious opponents to same-sex marriage
would share: “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group

155

See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 n.3 (1991) (criticizing the Court’s use of the “hybrid” exception
as “illustrative of poetic license”); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1990) (“One suspects that the notion
of ‘hybrid’ claims was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder . . . .”).
156
See Clark, supra note 77, at 660 (describing a free exercise case barred by Smith
that could potentially be made viable through the use of the hybrid-rights exception).
157
A free speech claim could also comprise part of a hybrid rights claim or even
constitute a stand-alone defense to same-sex marriage antidiscrimination laws;
however, a free speech analysis lies beyond the confines of this Comment.
158
WITTE, supra note 112, at 169 (2005) (“It is no small irony that today the free
speech clause affords considerably more protection to religious liberty than the free
exercise clause.”).
159
The Court has recognized “a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in
those activities protected by the First Amendment-—speech, assembly, petition for the
redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 618 (1984).
160
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
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161

association . . . .”
The expressive association right is correlative to
the free speech right because it is sometimes only possible for an
individual to have grievances heard or to obtain relief by banding
162
together with other like-minded speakers. As discussed above, both
the mere existence of a group and one’s membership in that group,
which to some degree signifies assent to the group’s shared beliefs,
163
can send powerful messages to members and non-members alike.
Like other First Amendment rights, the freedom of association
right is not absolute. Indeed, it is commonplace to find state and
local laws prohibiting private groups and clubs from discriminating
with respect to their membership, and the Supreme Court has held
that such discrimination is only protected in cases of intimate
association (meaning having only a few members) or where the
164
discrimination is integral to expressive activity. The qualified nature
of this right is especially relevant for religious entities that would seek
to exclude same-sex marriage couples from leadership or other public
positions that might suggest religious endorsement of their marriage
165
status. Absent statutory exemptions, these organizations would have
to rely on this circumscribed constitutional protection as articulated
by the courts.

161

Id.; cf. David B. Salmons, Toward a Fuller Understanding of Religious Exercise:
Recognizing the Identity-Generative and Expressive Nature of Religious Devotion, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1243, 1245 (1995) (asserting that “[p]ublicly expressing one’s . . . membership in
a class or group . . . is at the core of political speech”).
162
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 107, at 1396 (regarding freedom of association as
integral to free speech because “[g]roups have resources--in human capital and money-that a single person lacks”).
163
Id. (noting that “the very existence of group support for an idea conveys a
message”).
164
See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609 (holding that a national organization of men
between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five may not restrict its membership because of
the state’s compelling interest in preventing discrimination and the absence of a
finding that the inclusion of women would undermine the group’s expressive
activities); see also Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)
(holding that the forced admission of women to comply with a California law
prohibiting sex discrimination did not infringe the club’s First Amendment rights).
165
It is general Christian doctrine that one’s sexuality or views on same-sex
marriage would not ordinarily preclude one from membership in a church, but a
church may have legitimate concerns—just as the Boy Scouts did—about same-sex
marriage proponents assuming leadership roles. Even if a Christian church wanted to
restrict its membership to heterosexuals, I know of no mainstream strand of
Christianity whose tenets exclude homosexuals from membership because of their
sexuality. However, given explicit theology on same-sex marriage, any exclusion would
have to be directly related to an expressive showing contradicting these specific
teachings.

BOLD REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2009]

Vows to Collide

12/8/2009 12:25 PM

217

Importantly for religious institutions, the integral-to-expressiveactivity exception seems crafted precisely for the same-sex marriage
context. The leading case upholding the right of association and
166
defining this discrimination exception is Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.
In Dale, the Court held that freedom of association protected the Boy
Scouts, a private group dedicated to teaching moral and religious
virtues, from violating New Jersey’s public accommodation
antidiscrimination law when the Scouts chose to exclude an
167
outspoken gay-rights activist from its membership. The Boy Scouts’
core values included guidelines that its scouts be “morally straight”
and “clean,” and while the Scout’s internal documents were not
specific that these goals indicated disapproval of homosexuality, the
Supreme Court allowed the Boy Scouts to define for themselves what
168
their teaching meant.
Given this policy, the Court had to determine whether Dale’s
presence would “significantly burden” the Boy Scouts’ desire not to
169
promote the acceptability of the homosexual lifestyle.
Although
Dale had been an exemplary scout otherwise, he publicly advocated
170
The
his views favoring homosexuality on a number of occasions.
Court stated that it is proper to “give deference to an association’s
view of what would impair its expression,” and the Court concluded
171
that the Scouts’ decision to exclude Dale was permissible.
Importantly, the Court also noted that the expressive association right
is not an impermeable “shield against antidiscrimination laws” just

166

530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Id. at 644. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -5 (West 2002) (prohibiting
discrimination in New Jersey’s public accommodations). Due to state courts’
interpretations of New Jersey’s public accommodation law, it provides more substantial
coverage than similar laws in other states. Dale, 530 U.S. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court has given its public accommodation law “a
more expansive coverage than most similar state statutes”).
168
Id. at 651 (“We accept the Boy Scouts’ assertion. We need not inquire further
to determine the nature of the Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to
homosexuality.”). The Boy Scouts were also allowed to introduce evidence of several
position statements advising against the appropriateness of scout leaders being openly
gay and stating that homosexual conduct violates the Scout Oath. Id. at 651-52.
169
Id. at 653.
170
Id. at 645 (noting that Dale served as co-president of his university’s
Lesbian/Gay Alliance, was interviewed by a newspaper regarding his gay-rights
advocacy, and was identified in the newspaper article photograph as the Lesbian/Gay
Alliance co-president).
171
Id. at 653.
167
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because an organization decides acceptance of a member would
172
damage its message.
The Court held that the test for whether an unwanted member
violates expressive association was whether “the presence of that
person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate
173
public or private viewpoints.”
Three factors were critical to the
Court’s decision to allow the exclusion in this case: First, Dale was not
just a scout leader who happened to be homosexual; rather, he was a
174
vocal and currently active community leader for gay rights. Second,
the Boy Scouts actually and sincerely believed part of their identity or
175
mission was to inculcate virtues that did not include homosexuality.
Finally, the Court was convinced that Dale’s “presence” as an adult
member would “force the organization to send a message, both to the
youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
176
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”
B. Application of the Expressive Association Defense to the Ocean Grove
Case
How promising is Dale for religious institutions in the context of
the current same-sex marriage debate? The first point to underscore
is that the right-of-association doctrine only protects religious groups
and not religious believers individually. However, within the context
of religious groups, the Dale majority’s decision offers a remarkable
parallel to the predicament faced by religious institutions on the issue
of same-sex marriage.
One issue hotly contested in Dale was the specificity with which the
Boy Scouts had expressed their opposition to homosexuality in the
past.
Instead of expressly declaring a moral stance against
homosexuality, the Boy Scouts had expressed opposition using only
177
comprehensive terms such as “morally straight.”
The dissent
believed that the Boy Scouts’ documents failed to assert anything
178
specifically condemning homosexuality. The majority, however, did
172

Id.
Id. at 648.
174
Id. at 645 (noting that Dale was, among other things, co-president of his
university’s Gay/Lesbian Alliance).
175
Id. at 649-53 (“We cannot doubt that the Boy Scouts sincerely holds this view.”).
176
Id. at 653.
177
Id. at 667 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178
See id. at 665-71 (arguing that the Boy Scouts’ inclusion of terms like “morally
straight” in the Scout Oath and Law did not support a finding that the organization
173
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not require the Boy Scouts to use specific language regarding
homosexuality and allowed the organization to self-interpret its more
179
general language. Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that “it
is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed values
because they disagree with those values or find them internally
180
inconsistent.” Yet even under the stricter test advocated by the Dale
dissent, many religious institutions would have little difficulty pointing
to internal religious documents disavowing support for same-sex
181
Furthermore, given the Dale Court’s position that
marriage.
internal inconsistency is not a dispositive flaw, courts should not be
able to balance a religious institution’s proscriptions against same-sex
marriage with other seemingly contradictory principles generally
promoting openness, tolerance, or love.
Religious organizations, even those within the same
denomination, do not always agree on every point of theology or
doctrine, and this observation is nowhere more accurate than in the
182
United States, a country known for its religious diversity.
Certainly
there are some individual churches, religious organizations, or even
entire Christian denominations that already affirm or are moving
183
However, the Dale Court
toward affirming same-sex marriage.
makes it clear that unanimity of opinion is not required for First
Amendment protection of expressive association. The majority stated
that “[t]he fact that the [Boy Scouts] does not trumpet its views from
the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not
184
This
mean that its views receive no First Amendment protection.”
language is also beneficial for religious groups opposed to same-sex

taught opposition to homosexuality, especially in light of the fact that they directed
boys to seek advice on sexual matters from other sources).
179
Id. at 650 (majority opinion).
180
Id. at 651.
181
Many Roman Catholic, Protestant, Evangelical, Jewish, and Muslim groups, as
parts of established, institutionalized religions, would be able to cite internal
documents similarly specific to those cited by the Ocean Grove Methodists. See infra
note 206.
182
Justice Scalia has quipped that while France is famous for having two religions
and many different cheeses, the United States is famous for having just two cheeses
and many different religions. Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, A Conversation on the
Constitution: Perspectives from Active Liberty and A Matter of Interpretation (Dec. 5,
2006) (remarks of Justice Antonin Scalia), http://www.acslaw.org/node/3909.
183
See Graff, supra note 155, at 37 (“Several Christian denominations have also
recognized the religious value and spiritual dignity that characterizes many same-sex
relationships.”).
184
Dale, 530 U.S. at 656.
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marriage: Even if disapproval of same-sex marriage is the doctrine of
many religious organizations, that belief is not always trumpeted from
rooftops because it is a divisive issue. For any number of reasons,
religious organizations may choose to minimize potential sources of
controversy and conflict, even if the view is important to their
185
Religious organizations are also comprised of diverse
identity.
individuals, not all of whom would personally assent to every religious
186
tenet the organization holds.
The Dale Court makes clear that this
reality presents no limitation to the expressive association analysis.
The Court affirmed that “the First Amendment simply does not
require that every member of a group agree on every issue in order
187
Moreover,
for the group’s policy to be ‘expressive association.’”
given that opposition to same-sex marriage is not the raison d’être of
any denomination, the Court affirmed that the association need not
be organized for the “purpose” of advocating that particular
188
Finally, the majority in Dale rejected the relevance of
expression.
Justice Stevens’s comments in dissent regarding the increasing public
189
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded
acceptance of homosexuality.
that this evolution is no argument at all to those who continue to
190
reject more tolerant views towards homosexuality. One purpose of a
constitutional protection is to guarantee protection precisely when

185

See, e.g., Interview with William P. Wood, Senior Minister of First Presbyterian
Church, in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 21, 2003) (“We are not an issues church.”).
186
One commentator, discussing the increasing acceptance of same-sex
relationships within certain religious groups, observed that
[i]ncreasingly, religious organizations, congregations, and individual spiritual
leaders have concluded that their faiths require them to support equal
marriage rights for same-sex couples. These beliefs have taken root among an
array of religious communities, including mainstream denominations of
American Judaism and Christianity. Even within religions that formally
oppose same-sex marriage, individuals and organizations continue to agitate
for doctrinal change.
Graff, supra note 155, at 24.
187
Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
188
Id.; see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that St. Patrick’s Day parade organizers could prevent
gay-rights advocates from advocating their views at the parade despite the fact that the
parade was not held for the purpose of espousing any views on homosexuality).
189
Dale, 530 U.S. at 699-700 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 660 (majority
opinion) (dismissing Justice Stevens’s evidence as inapposite).
190
Id. (“[T]he fact that an idea may be embraced and advocated by increasing
numbers of people is all the more reason to protect the First Amendment rights of
those who wish to voice a different view.”).
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one’s beliefs or actions are opposed by a majority: “The First
191
Amendment protects expression, be it of a popular variety or not.”
How might the expressive association defense set forth above
apply to the conflict between religious institutions and same-sex
marriage that this Comment contemplates? The Ocean Grove case
mentioned at the beginning of this Comment provides an excellent
template for this analysis.
Resolution of the Ocean Grove case is still pending, but in
December 2008, the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights found
probable cause that the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association
violated New Jersey antidiscrimination law when it refused to allow a
192
lesbian civil union ceremony to occur on its premises. Ocean Grove
contested the ruling and stated that, consistent with its devoutly
Methodist purposes, history, and goals, the use of its property for a
same-sex civil commitment ceremony would violate its sincerely held
religious principles and expressive association rights. In July 2009, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the
case to the federal district court to decide Ocean Grove’s request for
declaratory relief on constitutional grounds regarding all of its
193
property.
Before proceeding further, a more detailed examination of the
facts of the Ocean Grove case is in order. Ocean Grove dates back to
1869 when it was founded as an explicitly Christian ministry for
194
worship, education, and recreation in a Christian seaside setting.
The New Jersey legislature incorporated the organization for the
specific purpose of serving as a “Christian” resort for United
Methodist members and friends, and from its inception the
195
organization has described its mission in explicitly religious terms.
191

Id.
See Op. N.J. Att’y Gen., Div. on Civil Rights, No. PN34XB-03008 (Dec. 29,
2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-v06CMA.pdf; see also Associated Press, supra note 3 (reporting on the finding of
probable cause).
193
Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church v. VespaPapaleo, Nos. 07-4253, 07-4543, 2009 WL 2048914, at *1-2 (3d Cir. July 15, 2009).
194
Act of March 3, 1870, ch. 157, 1870 N.J. Laws 397 (incorporating Ocean Grove
“for the purpose of providing and maintaining for the members and friends of the
Methodist Episcopal Church a proper, convenient and desirable permanent camp
meeting ground and [C]hristian seaside resort”).
195
MORRIS S. DANIELS, THE STORY OF OCEAN GROVE 35 (1919) (quoting Ocean
Grove’s first president describing the Camp Meeting Association’s “preeminently
Religious” goals and stating that its “primary object” is to “keep its eye to the glory of
God” and “to promote the highest forms of religious life”).
192
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Indeed, Ocean Grove’s first president stated that all would be
welcome provided that they understood the association’s Christian
196
Today, the
purposes and had “sympathy with our objects.”
association’s bylaws stipulate that all voting Board of Trustees
197
members must be United Methodists.
While the association leases
some of the land it owns in the city of Ocean Grove (it owns the whole
community), it controls the Boardwalk Pavilion at issue in this case,
which has housed worship services since the 1880s and is used today
for worship services, children’s Bible School programs, summer
concerts, and Gospel Music Ministry programs, which are held two to
198
three times daily during the summer. “The Association considers all
of its events to be instrumental in bringing members of the
199
community to faith in Jesus Christ.” Although the public is welcome
to occupy the facility when it is unused, the public must “abide by
200
Finally,
[Ocean Grove’s] rules and regulations” when doing so.
while the Pavilion has on occasion been rented to the public in the
past for wedding ceremonies, it “has not . . . been made generally
201
available to the public for any other purposes.”
The plaintiffs in Ocean Grove are Harriet Bernstein and her
partner, Luisa Paster, who sought to rent the Boardwalk Pavilion as
the location for their private, same-sex civil union commitment
ceremony. Ocean Grove denied the couple’s request to use the
facility for this purpose, citing “the Association’s religious beliefs as
reflected in the United Methodist Book of Discipline and the Holy
202
Bible.”
After unsuccessfully petitioning Ocean Grove’s board of
trustees for reconsideration, the couple filed a grievance with the New
203
Jersey Division on Civil Rights.
How should this glimpse into the ongoing conflict of same-sex
marriage and religious freedom be resolved under the expressive
196

Id.
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5, Ocean
Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, No.
3:07-cv-03802 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2007).
198
Id. at 7.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 8.
203
A second lesbian couple, Janice Moore and Emily Sonnessa, also challenged
Ocean Grove’s denial, but the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights found no probable
cause for their allegations. See Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United
Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, Nos. 07-4253, 07-4543, 2009 WL 2048914, at *1-2
n.2 (3d Cir. July 15, 2009).
197
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association doctrine? In the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, Ocean Grove lost its motion for a preliminary
injunction against the state’s enforcement action. However, the
court’s decision rested on federal abstention grounds and did not
204
reach the merits of Ocean Grove’s First Amendment arguments.
The test that Ocean Grove must pass is whether the presence of
the same-sex civil commitment ceremony would affect “in a significant
way the [association’s] ability to advocate [its] public or private
205
viewpoints.”
First, did the ceremony implicate one of the
association’s public or private viewpoints? Of central import in Dale
was the manner in which the Boy Scouts had—both prior to and
during litigation—announced their opposition to homosexuality as an
important goal of their organization. Whereas the Boy Scouts had
only ambiguous general phrases that opposed advocating
homosexuality prior to litigation, Ocean Grove, as an arm of the
United Methodist Church, could point to specific, official church
documents to detail the institution’s position on homosexuality and
same-sex marriage. Ocean Grove could specifically cite to the United
Methodist Book of Discipline to make utterly clear its stance on same-sex
206
Even were these texts less clear,
marriage and homosexuality.
Ocean Grove would be free to interpret its own views on whether
using its facility for a same-sex commitment ceremony would violate
207
its expressive interests. Given the legal test from Dale, this freedom
204

Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church v. VespaPapaleo, No. 07-3802, 2007 WL 3349787 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2007) (holding that the
Younger abstention doctrine counseled the federal district court to allow the New Jersey
courts to continue adjudicating the pending state proceeding due to issues that
implicated important state interests and plaintiff’s ability to raise constitutional
challenges in state court).
205
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
206
On marriage, the Book of Discipline both affirms the Church’s view of traditional
marriage and disapproves of same-sex marriage. THE BOOK OF DISCIPLINE OF THE
UNITED METHODIST CHURCH 2008, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES, ¶ 161C (2009) (“We affirm the
sanctity of the marriage covenant that is expressed in love, mutual support, personal
commitment, and shared fidelity between a man and a woman.”); id. ¶ 341
(“Ceremonies that celebrate homosexual unions shall not be conducted by our
ministers and shall not be conducted in our churches.”). Regarding homosexuality,
the Book of Discipline states clear opposition to the compatibility of homosexual practice
with Methodist teaching. Id. ¶ 161F (noting that the “United Methodist Church does
not condone the practice of homosexuality and consider[s] this practice incompatible
with Christian teaching”).
207
Cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 575 (1995) (“[I]t boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a
particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government’s
power to control.”).
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of choice, the association’s history, and the Methodist Church’s
unambiguous texts all point to a sincerely held expressive belief
justifying exclusion of the same-sex commitment ceremony on the
association’s property.
Second, does the nature of the threat posed by the same-sex civil
commitment ceremony pose a “significant” expressive harm to Ocean
Grove? In Dale, the threat arose from the fact that membership in the
Boy Scouts would be extended to a publicly known, outspoken leader
of the gay rights movement. In Ocean Grove’s case, there is arguably
less of a threat from the notoriety of the couple—neither individual
had been a well-known gay rights advocate—but more of a threat from
the act they would be performing on Ocean Grove’s property. The
fact that same-sex civil commitment ceremonies never officially occur
in a United Methodist Church worship space strongly suggests that the
occurrence of even one such event would generate significant
publicity. Just as there has been media interest in the developments
of this case, presumably there would have been public notice that a
same-sex ceremony was performed.
Had the ceremony occurred, the public would be justified in
wondering whether the United Methodist Church had sanctioned the
ceremony, whether the church had changed its longstanding policy
against same-sex marriage, whether there was internal dispute about
the status of that longstanding policy, or whether same-sex
ceremonies would now be a regular occurrence in United Methodist
Church facilities. For the majority in Dale, it was not Dale’s expected
use of the bully pulpit or any other public action that the Boy Scouts
believed would hinder its expressive association ability; rather, it was
the mere presence of Dale as a member that would have potentially
caused the Boy Scouts to convey a message of acceptance to
208
homosexuality that it does not wish to convey.
Given this analysis, and the Dale Court’s admission that it
“must . . . give deference to an association’s view of what would impair
its expression,” the harm in this case appears at least as damaging as
209
the harm in Dale. Under a doctrine of expressive association similar

208

Dale, 530 U.S. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The majority . . . does not rest its
conclusion on the claim that Dale will use his position as a Bully pulpit. Rather, it
contends that Dale’s mere presence among the Boy Scouts will itself force the group to
convey a message about homosexuality . . . .”).
209
Id. at 653 (majority opinion). The effect of the damage in the Ocean Grove
case is not distinguishable from Dale simply because the lesbian couple did not seek to
become “members” of Ocean Grove.
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to the one enunciated in Dale, it is likely that the Ocean Grove
pavilion owners would have a strong chance of mounting an equally
successful defense.
C. Application of the Expressive Association Doctrine to the Ocean Grove
Case According to Justice Stevens’s Dale Dissent
Given that Dale is the Court’s first major attempt at giving shape to
the expressive association doctrine—and that the Dale Court divided
five to four—how might the Ocean Grove case come out under the
doctrine as understood by Justice Stevens in the Dale dissent? In
some respects, the facts of the Ocean Grove case ameliorate problems
identified with the majority’s analysis in Dale. However, Justice
Stevens’s dissent appears animated by a fundamentally different view
towards how protective the courts should be of the expressive rights of
private groups and the potential discrimination that individuals could
face as a result. Even if one ultimately concludes, as I do, that the
Ocean Grove case would likely come out the same way as under Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s understanding of the doctrine, there is no
shortage of ammunition in Justice Stevens’s opinion suggesting a
court could resolve the Ocean Grove case differently.
First, how does Justice Stevens’s dissent view expressive association
law? The dissent exhibited less affinity for expressive association law
but did acknowledge the existence of such a right, citing the Court’s
210
But the dissent was also
decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.
quick to point out that there is no absolute right to association for
expressive purposes and that before the Dale decision the Court had
“never once” found an expressive association right that trumped state
211
The dissent focused its attention on two
antidiscrimination law.
212
prior expressive association cases, Rotary Club and Roberts, and
highlighted that expressive association claims failed in both because
the groups were simply trying to enforce “exclusionary membership”
policies and that allowing a member to join against their wishes would
213
Justice Stevens’s dissent thus made
not jeopardize their message.
clear that to qualify for protection, a group must have more than just
210

Id. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984)).
211
Id. at 679.
212
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
213
See Dale, 530 U.S. at 682 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing principles
articulated in Jaycees and Rotary Club regarding how to prevail on a claim of expressive
association).
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“some connection” between its expression and its exclusions.
The
dissent’s overall tenor suggested that this bloc of the Court envisions a
more limited expressive association doctrine than does the Dale
majority, particularly when used to avoid compliance with important
215
state antidiscrimination laws.
The dissent likewise held a different view towards what a group
must do to make its policy position clear and to connect that policy to
the group’s expressive activities. According to the dissent, the Court
should make an active inquiry into the content of the group’s message
to ensure that it actually articulates and holds a certain view and to
consider whether the group’s message would be “significantly
216
Presumably
affected” by compliance with antidiscrimination law.
out of a concern that groups not be allowed to discriminate by
217
contriving sham beliefs, Justice Stevens’s framework would require
an organization to show, with evidence adopted prior to the litigation,
218
219
internally consistent,
and
that its position was unequivocal,
220
publicly expressed. Contrary to the majority’s approach in allowing
a group to testify itself regarding what it believes and how contrary
expression would harm its mission, Justice Stevens’s approach
demands exacting proof and anticipation about how a group’s views
might be challenged in litigation. Despite this more rigorous analysis,
Ocean Grove would quite possibly still meet this heightened test
because of its official connection to the United Methodist Church and
the specific, public documents that describe Methodist theology
regarding same-sex marriage.
Even with the facts in the Ocean Grove case, that outcome is not
guaranteed when groups must prove the clarity and certainty of their
positions without the benefit of any contemporaneous commentary
on how the group interprets its documentation. For Ocean Grove, a

214

Id.
Justice Stevens opened his dissent with a rousing recognition of New Jersey’s
desire to “eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of all types” from society. Id.
at 663 (quoting Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389 A.2d 465, 478 (N.J.
1978)).
216
Id. at 686 (“[T]hat inquiry requires our independent analysis, rather than
deference to a group’s litigating posture.”).
217
Id. at 687 (“If this Court were to defer . . . there would be no way to mark the
proper boundary between genuine exercises of the right to associate . . . and sham
claims . . . .”).
218
Id.
219
Id. at 671-73.
220
Id. at 672.
215
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court resolute not to uphold its rights to expressive association could
offer a number of arguments to combat the group’s own
interpretation of its beliefs. For one, the court could argue that the
group’s connection with the United Methodist Church is too
attenuated for it to rely on the national church’s theological
statements. This concern could be particularly damaging if a court
were persuaded by the fact that some para-church organizations are
more liberal than the official orthodoxy of the national church itself
and that, without specific incorporation of the national church’s
theology or documents, the para-church’s beliefs would not be
sufficiently articulated.
Perhaps as well, a court could attempt to use conflicting
statements made in church documents to suggest the lack of a
coherent message.
For example, despite concluding that
homosexuality is inconsistent with church teaching, the United
Methodist Book of Discipline states that “all persons” need the church’s
ministry, that homosexuals are persons of “sacred worth,” and that the
221
church’s ministry is “for and with all persons.” Even though the Boy
Scouts explicitly stated that homosexuality and leadership in scouting
were incompatible, the Court decided that the Boy Scout’s position
222
was “far more equivocal” when its whole context was considered.
Further, with the requirement that the belief be expressed publicly
rather than relegated exclusively to internal documents, one wonders
whether courts would entertain extensive examinations into how often
the policy on same-sex marriage had been publicly discussed,
emphasized, or referenced when Ocean Grove formulated its policies
for renting the pavilion for marriage services.
Depending on one’s perspective, Justice Stevens’s approach
displays the virtue or vice of a court telling a religious organization
what morality should mean to them instead of following the
presumption of letting the private organization interpret and express
its own values. Naturally, an organization should have to present
some reasonable evidence that its claim is not a sham, but Justice
Stevens’s approach seems to insist that a private organization prove its
own views not just to the point of reasonableness but so that those
223
beliefs could stand up in court against any potential inconsistencies.

221

BOOK OF DISCIPLINE, supra note 206, ¶ 161F.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 671, 676 (“[Boy Scouts] never took any clear and unequivocal
position on homosexuality.”).
223
See, e.g., id. at 675.
222
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From the perspective of religious institutions, Justice Stevens’s
approach presents several challenges. Such a rigorous test may
prevent a private organization from adjusting its views in a sensitive
way so as not to create distracting controversy: Justice Stevens’s
dissent emphasized the fact that the Boy Scouts did not make public
their more explicit policies about how to handle homosexual
224
Failure to do so does not necessarily mean that a
leadership.
group’s views are not sincerely held, but especially in matters as
delicate as opposition to same-sex marriage, sometimes treading
lightly with a more subtle footprint is the more pragmatic course.
These same concerns might prompt an organization to reject taking
“any clear and unequivocal position on homosexuality” as Justice
225
Stevens’s dissent suggested is required.
These same complaints pertain to the way Justice Stevens’s
approach would consider the prospective harm that would occur to a
group’s expression. As opposed to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s approach
that allows the group itself to decide whether and how severe an
impediment exists to the institution’s expressive association, under
Justice Stevens’s approach this matter is for the court to decide. It is,
however, not difficult to imagine a court accepting the documentary
proof of a group’s legitimate belief against same-sex marriage but
holding that allowing one or a handful of same-sex ceremonies to take
place indirectly under its auspices would not be a substantial burden
226
All told, even under Justice Stevens’s
to the group’s expression.
approach, Ocean Grove may reasonably expect to satisfy the
requirements for a successful expressive association defense in its case,
but Justice Stevens’s approach presents more serious hurdles;
presumably, fewer religious institutions would qualify under that
regime.

224

Id.
Justice Stevens concluded that despite the Boy Scouts’ internal policy
statements declaring that the Boy Scouts do “not believe that homosexuality and
leadership in Scouting are appropriate,” “nothing in these policy statements supports”
the Boy Scouts’ claim. Id. at 671, 676 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
226
See id. at 684 (“The evidence before this Court makes it exceptionally clear that
[Boy Scouts] has, at most, simply adopted an exclusionary membership policy and has
no shared goal of disapproving of homosexuality.”).
225
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D. Implications of the Expressive Association
Doctrine for Religious Institutions
Given the expressive association doctrine and its articulation in
Dale, the defense does appear to offer a vibrant source of First
Amendment protection for religious institutions that seek to avoid
liability for violating antidiscrimination laws with respect to same-sex
marriage. Under the majority’s framework in Dale, the case is easier to
prove, because the right of the private group to state for itself its
beliefs and the expressive consequences of violating those beliefs
leaves less room for a court’s exercise of its independent judgment.
Yet, even under Justice Stevens’s paradigm, religious groups that have
documentation of their specific beliefs will benefit as long as their
doctrines and views on same-sex marriage are clear and wellpreserved. Though the legal case would be more difficult under this
framework, it is plausible that religious groups could still find
sufficient protection in many cases.
CONCLUSION
Despite the Massachusetts and California Supreme Courts’ bold
declarations to the contrary, if anything is clear in the wake of the
recent landmark same-sex marriage decisions, it is the assurance of a
turbulent future for the free exercise of religious proponents of
traditional marriage. Because marriage is a fundamentally religious
concept for most American religious institutions, government
enforcement of same-sex marriage poses a challenge to many religious
institutions on religious and not just political grounds. Given
traditional and still-prevailing theological views about the nature and
scope of religious activity, many religious institutions will argue that it
is their religious duty to offer a public defense of traditional marriage
and to avoid any public involvement contrary to their expressive
identity. As the Ocean Grove case illustrates, this religious duty will in
many instances directly conflict with state or federal same-sex
antidiscrimination laws.
Ironically, to confront this new wave of legal conflict, religious
institutions that oppose same-sex marriage will likely find firmer
constitutional ground under the expressive association doctrine than
under the Free Exercise Clause. Despite at least one prominent
interpretation of the Clause’s text and intent for affording strong free
exercise rights to religious institutions, the Court’s jurisprudence in
Smith and Lukumi has stymied robust constitutional protection against
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neutral, generally applicable statutes. The expressive association
doctrine, however, especially as articulated by the Dale Court, offers a
potentially more successful First Amendment defense for religious
institutions seeking to avoid liability for violating same-sex
antidiscrimination laws.

